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Essence, Existence, and Necessity: Spinozaʼs Modal Metaphysics

“For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we see light.”1

Austen Haynes

1

Psalms 36:9.

2
Abstract
“In thought, as in nature, there is no creation from absolute nothing.” I have taken
on the daunting project of giving an account of Spinoza’s metaphysics, and laying
out the reasoning behind his doctrines. In a letter written in December 1675,
barely over a year before his death, Spinoza told Henry Oldenburg that the
fatalistic necessity (which was disturbing readers of his philosophy) was in fact
the “principal basis” of his Ethics. Since all of his metaphysical doctrines are
entwined with this necessity, it is my task to piece this puzzle together. In this
thesis, I will begin by discussing his definitions and axioms, and proceed to
unfold his substance monism. I will then discuss his proofs of the existence of
God, followed by his doctrine of God’s simplicity, causality, and eternality. I will
then examine the relation of modes to substance, and the classifications of
modes. From all of this I will conclude with an account of Spinoza’s
necessitarianism. There are a number of objections that have been raised
against Spinoza: that he arbitrarily defines his basic metaphysical terms,
“stacking the deck” in favor of his system, that he assimilates the causal relation
to the relation of logical implication, that there is a problem of divine attributes,
that he does not adequately show that substance must produce modes, and that
he does not show how the infinite mediate modes are deduced from the infinite
immediate modes, or how motion follows from extension. In my discussion of
Spinoza’s metaphysics, I will touch on all of these issues.2

2

I would like to especially thank John Peterson for advising me in this project, and for enriching
discussions on countless topics in metaphysics.
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I. Introduction
Giving an account of Spinozaʼs metaphysics is by nature similar to solving a
puzzle. The definitions and axioms serve as the primary pieces, the building
blocks which present us with a glimpse into the whole that is to be constructed,
and is incomplete if any pieces are missing. It is a complex puzzle that requires
the greatest care and attention to complete, as if this puzzle were intertwined with
numerous other puzzle pieces that deceptively appear to belong to the same
puzzle, but do not. The influence of Spinozaʼs philosophy has been monumental.
Hegel famously said that one is either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all.
Nietzsche declared Spinoza to be his philosophical predecessor.3 Einstein
referred to himself as a follower of Spinoza, responding in a telegram on his
religious views that he believes in Spinozaʼs God, who reveals himself in the
lawful harmony of the world. Despite this positive reception of Spinoza, there is
also a vast amount of negative reception. Spinoza found himself facing the knife
when an attempt to assassinate him failed.4 He was issued a cherem, a
particularly severe form of excommunication from the Jewish community that
involves shunning. In his own time, a leading French theologian called Spinoza
“the most impious and dangerous man of the century.” A powerful bishop
similarly declared that this “insane and evil man…deserves to be covered with
chains and whipped with a rod.” Henry Oldenburg remarked on behalf of other
readers of Spinoza that if his doctrine of necessitarianism is affirmed, then “the
sinews of all law, all virtue and religion are severed.”5 This distaste for Spinozaʼs
doctrine of necessity is still alive today. In his book on Spinoza, Jonathan Bennett
refers to his necessitarianism as “that being the dangerously false thesis towards
which his explanatory rationalism is pushing him.”6 As Samuel Newlands claims,
“from Spinoza's contemporaries to our own, readers of the Ethics have
denounced Spinoza's views on modality as metaphysically confused at best,
ethically nihilistic at worst.”7 It is perhaps this same feeling that led a philosophy
professor at my university to say of the relevance of Spinozaʼs thought today that
“Spinoza is dead.”
I have taken on the project of giving an account of Spinozaʼs metaphysics,
and laying out the reasoning behind his doctrines. I will begin by discussing his
definitions and axioms, and proceed to unfold his one substance doctrine. I will
then discuss his proofs of the existence of God, followed by his doctrine of Godʼs
simplicity, causality, and eternality. I will then examine the relation of modes to
substance, and the classifications of modes. From all of this I will conclude with
an account of Spinozaʼs necessitarianism. Spinoza describes his modal
3

“Ich habe einen Vorganger, und was für einen!” From a letter to Overbeck, 30 July 1881.
For an account of this incident, see Nadler, Spinoza: A Life, 110-111.
5
Epistle LXXIV. CW, 944.
6
Bennett, A Study of Spinozaʼs Ethics, 121.
7
Newlands, Spinozaʼs Modal Metaphysics.
4

5
metaphysics as the “principle basis”8 of the Ethics, and since all of his
metaphysical doctrines are entwined with this necessity, it is my task in this
paper to piece this puzzle together. There are a number of objections that have
been raised against Spinoza: that he arbitrarily defines his basic metaphysical
terms, “stacking the deck” in favor of his system, that he assimilates the causal
relation to the relation of logical implication, that there is a problem of divine
attributes, that he does not adequately show that substance must produce
modes, and that he does not show how the infinite mediate modes are deduced
from the infinite immediate modes, or how motion follows from extension. In my
discussion of Spinozaʼs metaphysics, I will touch on all of these issues.9

II. The Definition and Relation of Substance and Mode
The fundamental principles of Spinozaʼs ontology10 are not a radical departure
from his predecessors.11 Valtteri Viljanen has argued that the relation of
substance and mode, despite Spinozaʼs peculiar vocabulary, should be seen as
both familiar and intelligible, and he demonstrates that Spinozaʼs understanding
of these matters harks back to the traditional distinction of substance and
accident, or thing and property.12 I follow Viljanenʼs explanation of substance and
mode, and this view will be presented in what follows. Spinozaʼs definitions of
substance and mode are given at the beginning of the Ethics:
Definition III: By substance I understand what is in itself and is
conceived through itself, i.e., that whose concept does not require
the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed.
Definition V: By mode I understand the affections of a substance, or
that which is in another through which it is also conceived.13
The fact that substances are in and conceived through themselves, whereas
modes are in and conceived through another, implies that substance holds an
ontological and epistemological priority over modes.14 A substance is in itself,
8

Epistle LXXV. CW, 945.
Since writing this thesis, my views on have changed on various issues. This may not always
reflect my current interpretations.
10
The study of the general nature of being, or the most basic features of what exists, as such.
See, for example, Aristotleʼs discussion of ʻbeing as beingʼ in Metaphysics IV.
11
A recent commentator, Valtteri Viljanen, has given a persuasive argument in favor of this, which
has influenced my view on the topic.
12
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 56. In: Koistinen (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Spinozaʼs
Ethics.
13
Ethics, I, Definitions III and V. C I.408-409.
14
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 57.
9
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while a mode is in another. To understand what this means it is useful to go back
to Aristotleʼs classic distinction of substance and accident. Accidents are entities
that cannot exist on their own, and require a substance to serve as a subject in
which it exists. Accidents inhere in subjects, while substances are entities that
subsist. While accidents depend upon the substances in which they inhere,
substances are not similarly dependent on their accidents. Substances are
individuated by the basic features of their essence, and not by their accidents. In
the Metaphysics, Aristotle had defined substance as:
That of which other things are predicated, while it is itself not
predicated of anything else.15
Consider the following passage in the Summa Theologiae of St. Thomas
Aquinas, which Spinozaʼs definitions strongly echo: “Those things subsist which
exist in themselves, and not in another.”16 Aristotleʼs distinction between
subsistence and inherence is reflected in Spinozaʼs being in itself and being in
another.17 This same framework is explicitly evident in Descartes, particularly in
his Principles of Philosophy, where he assigns a causal independence to
substances:
By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which
exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its
existence.18
Descartes identified God as the only being that can be understood to depend on
no other thing whatsoever. However, Descartes also said that both mind and
body are substances which “can exist only with the help of Godʼs concurrence.”19
Descartes concludes this definition by stating:
In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they
cannot exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary
concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this distinction by
calling the latter ʻsubstancesʼ and the former ʻqualitiesʼ or ʻattributesʼ
of those substances.20
Spinoza accepts the basic principle of the Cartesian definition of substance, but
he doesnʼt follow Descartes by including mind and body as substances. When
Spinoza says that substance does not require the conception of any other thing
than itself, he rules out mind and body as substances, since their essence is
15

Aristotle, Metaphysics, VII, 3, 1029a1-2.
Summa Theologiae, I, 29.2, resp.
17
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 58.
18
Principles, I, 51. CSM I.210.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
16
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predicated on something else, namely God.21 Substance has to be something
which isnʼt constrained or defined by anything else. Substance canʼt be a quality
or a relation, as these terms imply dependence on things distinct from
themselves. All relations and qualities are secondary and predicated on
substance.22
It is evident, as Viljanen has argued, that Spinozaʼs definition that substances
are in themselves, and modes are in another, is in accordance with the traditional
way of conceiving things and their properties: “there are those things, namely
substances, that do not exist in anything else but are ontologically selfsupporting; and there are those things, namely modes or modifications –
Spinozaʼs gloss for accidents – that exist in, or inhere in, something, namely
substances.”23 This is the meaning of the definitions of substance and mode,
which are not arbitrary. There are no causal notions contained in these
definitions.24 “Thus, Spinoza takes himself to be entitled to hold, without offering
any further proof, that modes are affections of substance,25 and it is evident from
this that substance is logically prior in nature to its affections, which constitutes
the first proposition of the Ethics. Further, since it is an axiom that “whatever is, is
either in itself or in another,”26 it can also be inferred that “outside the intellect
there is nothing except substances and their affections.”27 The only entities in
Spinozaʼs ontology classifiable as things are substances and modes.28
What does it mean to be in something? And how is the axiom that whatever
is, is either in itself or in another, self-evident? The simplicity and clarity of this
axiom is apparent, for Spinoza is merely telling us that if a thing exists, it must fall
within one of two categories: existence that is fully independent or existence that
is dependent on something else. The former is a substance, whereas the latter is
a mode or modification. There is no third category, for we canʼt say that
something is in nothing. The second axiom, that “what cannot be conceived
through another, must be conceived through itself”29 is complementary with the
first axiom, and its self-evidence is the same. The first axiom dealt with the
existential, or metaphysical, whereas the second axiom deals with the
conceptual, or epistemological. When I conceive something, either I think of the
thing through itself, or I employ a notion of a thing external to it to form my
thought of the thing. Again, there are only two possible categories, and this is
self-evidently known. Note that Spinoza has not said anything about the
21

This idea of predication will come up again later on, esp. see Ethics, I, Proposition XVII, Schol.
C I.424.
22
Compare with inherence in Ethics, I, Propositions XV and XVIII. C I.420, 428.
23
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59.
24
Carriero, On the Relationship between Mode and Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 261.
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59.
25
Viljanen, Ibid.
26
Ethics, I, Axiom I. C I.410.
27
Ethics, I, Proposition IV. C I.411.
28
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 59.
29
Ethics, I, Axiom II. C I.410.
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adequacy of the conceiving, and he will later say that any idea we form of any
finite mode involves the concept of something else. 30 What it involves the
concept of is the attribute that constitutes the essence of substance in which the
mode inheres.31
What Spinoza has said thus far is quite traditional, as Viljanen has pointed
out:
The way in which conceivability is treated in Definition III and
Definition V reflects the definitional priority Aristotelians considered
substances to have over accidents: a definition reveals the essence
of the thing defined, and the definition of an accident must refer to
something other than the accident, namely the subject in which the
accident in question inheres, whereas a substance is definable
without reference to anything external to the substance. So when
Spinoza elucidates his claim that a substance is conceived through
itself by saying that a substanceʼs ʻconcept does not require the
concept of another thing, from which it must be formedʼ (Definition
III), he can be regarded as proceeding broadly along traditional
lines.32
Further, as numerous scholars have noted,33 the influence of Descartes is
evident in what Spinoza has said thus far. Consider the following passage:
A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but
each substance has one principle property which constitutes its
nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are
referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes
the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the
nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be
attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of
an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is
simply one of the various modes of thinking. For example, shape is
unintelligible except in an extended thing; and motion is
unintelligible except as motion in an extended space; while
imagination, sensation and will are intelligible only in a thinking
thing. By contrast, it is possible to understand extension without
shape or movement, and thought without imagination or sensation,
and so on; and this is quite clear to anyone who gives the matter
his attention.34
30

Ethics, II, Proposition XLV. C I.481.
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 60.
32
Ibid.
33
Carriero, On the Relation between Mode and Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 250.
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 60. Gueroult, Spinoza, 60-63.
34
Principles, I, 53. CSM I.210-211.
31
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This simply means that to conceive any body, we must conceive extension, and
to conceive any idea, we must conceive thought. Viljanen argues that Spinoza is
treading on “well-established grounds” when he says that substances are
conceived through themselves and modes are conceived through another. It is
merely his own formulation of the “conceptual priority traditionally given to
substances over properties.”35 It is thus well-founded to claim, as numerous other
scholars have, that Spinozaʼs definitions of substance and mode contain nothing
controversial.36 We can sum up what Spinoza has said as follows: “Whenever we
think of something, we are thinking of some thing, (i.e., a substance), but that
thing must always be a thing of some kind, it cannot be without some qualities,
properties, or modes.”37

III. Spinozaʼs Definition of Attribute
The next subject of Spinozaʼs ontology is the attributes. Attributes are “what
the intellect perceives of substance, as constituting its essence.”38 While
substance is the most basic and essential being, and mode is a particular aspect
of that being, attributes are ways of being. Descartes had similarly defined a
principal attribute as that which constitutes a substanceʼs nature or essence.39
We might ask, what does it mean to constitute somethingʼs essence? To
constitute the essence of a substance is to possess essential properties such
that if these properties were absent, it is impossible to conceive of the
substance.40 This has given rise to an objection: If substance is conceived
through itself, how can it not be conceived apart from an attribute? In the
scholium to Proposition X Spinoza will state that each substance is conceived
through itself and that “each being must be conceived under some attribute.”41
Thus, substance must be conceived under some attribute. If this is the case, we
are presented with yet another dilemma: does this not make attributes
conceptually prior to substances?
A popular solution to this problem is to identify substance with attributes.42 In
fact, there is strong textual evidence to support this. Consider the following:
35

Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61.
Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method, 11-12. Carriero, On the Relation between Mode and
Substance in Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 250. Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61. Note that Wolfson
has argued, to the contrary, that Spinoza offers a new way of understanding mode. Cf. Wolfson, I,
61-78.
37
Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 61.
38
Ethics, I, Definition IV. C I.408.
39
Principles, I, 53. CSM I.210.
40
Ethics, II, Definition II. C I.447.
41
Ethics, I, Proposition X, Schol. C I.416.
42
Curley, Spinozaʼs Metaphysics, 16-18. Gueroult and Jarrett also argue in favor of this.
36
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Whatever is, is either in itself or in another (by Axiom I), i.e., (by
Definitions III and V), outside the intellect there is nothing except
substances and their affections. Therefore, there is nothing outside
the intellect through which a number of things can be distinguished
from one another except substance, or what is the same (by
Definition IV), their attributes, and their affections, q.e.d.43
Further, in an epistle from 1661 the young Spinoza had originally defined
attribute in the same way that he defines substance in the Ethics:
By attribute I understand whatever is conceived through itself and is
in itself, so that its concept does not involve the concept of another
thing.44
An epistle from 1663 also supports this interpretation, where Spinoza defines
substance:
By substance I understand what is in itself and is conceived
through itself, i.e., whose concept does not involve the concept of
another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that it is
called attribute in relation to the intellect, which attributes such and
such a definite nature to substance.45
This interpretation still isnʼt without its own problems. In the scholium to
Proposition X, Spinoza says:
It is far from absurd to attribute many attributes to one substance.
Indeed, nothing in nature is clearer than that each being must be
conceived under some attribute, and the more reality, or being it
has, the more it has attributes which express necessity, or eternity,
and infinity. And consequently there is also nothing clearer than that
a being absolutely infinite must be defined (as we taught in
Definition VI) as a being that consists of infinite attributes, each of
which expresses a certain eternal and infinite essence.46
The problem is that if substance and its attributes are identical, then how can one
substance with many attributes still be one substance and not many substances?
43

Ethics, I, Proposition IV, Dem. C I.411. Curley also points to Spinozaʼs definition of God as a
substance consisting of infinite attributes. Consider also, Proposition XIX: “God is eternal, or all
Godʼs attributes are eternal.” Proposition XX, Corol. II. “God, or all of Godʼs attributes, are
immutable.” C I.427-428.
44
Epistle II. C I.165.
45
Epistle IX. C I.195.
46
Ethics, I, Proposition X, Schol. C I.416.

11
It would seem that this objection leaves us in a sad state of affairs. Fortunately,
Olli Koistinen has given a promising answer to this question. Viljanen
summarizes Koistinenʼs view as follows:
Koistinen accepts that the concept of substance and its attribute
must be identical, but observes that somewhat surprisingly this
does not entail, for Spinoza, that a substance would be identical
with its attribute. This is so, Koistinen suggests, because ideas are
active affirmations, that is, propositions that always predicate
properties of something, and we can regard the idea of a certain
substance whose essence is constituted by a certain attribute, let
us say E, as a proposition that predicates E of the substance in
question. Thus a proposition ʻSubstance is Eʼ – or, more exactly,
ʻSomething is Eʼ – expresses the absolutely primitive ontological
feature of Spinozaʼs system. That is, substances and attributes are
as it were inextricably fused together: the above proposition is not
only the concept of the substance in question but also the concept
of the attribute in question, that is, of E. There can be no idea of a
substance without an idea of an attribute, and the idea of an
attribute always contains the idea of a substance. That the abovementioned complex proposition reveals the foundation of Spinozaʼs
ontology explains how the concepts of substance and attribute can
be identical while substance and attribute still remain distinct
entities. And because the concepts of substance and attribute are
identical, that it can be said that a substance is conceived both
through itself and through its attribute poses no threat to the tenet
that the concept of substance – and thus also of an attribute – does
not refer to or involve any other concept, making it conceptually
independent.47
If this solves the problem of how a substance can be conceived both through
itself and through its attribute, there is still the further difficulty of how one
substance can have many attributes, each constituting its essence. This is known
as the problem of attributes, and it is a problem I will look at more closely later on
in this paper.48 I will only say here that there are two sides to this issue:
subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivists claim that Spinozaʼs definition of
attribute supports the view that the attributes are only what our intellect perceives
as if constituting the essence of substance, but do not really constitute its
essence. The problem with this interpretation is threefold: it makes Spinoza too
47

Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 63-64. From Koistinen, On the Metaphysics of Spinozaʼs Ethics,
18-24.
48
I discuss this issue more thoroughly in a separate Appendix devoted to the problem of
attributes All further references to “Appendix” without referencing Spinozaʼs work are to this. I give
an brief summary of this in the last three sections.
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much of an idealist, the definition of attribute does not actually support the claim
that Spinoza is a subjectivist, and there are multiple propositions that directly
conflict with the subjectivist reading. While subjectivism would seem to solve the
problem of attributes, and thus has an appeal, it canʼt legitimately be accepted as
a plausible interpretation. Spinoza speaks of attributes as something real and
objective, not depending on an individual perceiver to exist.
Attributes are really distinct, but Spinoza holds that it does not follow from this
that each attribute must constitute a thing of its own. This view is expressed
clearly by Michael Della Roccaʼs interpretation of a conceptual barrier between
attributes:
No attribute, say E, can offer grounds for a substance not to have
some other attribute, say T, because then a fact about T – that it is
not possessed by a certain substance – would be explained by E;
but then something concerning T would be conceived through E,
and this would go against Tʼs status as an attribute, that is, as
something that is conceived solely through itself.49
But what does it all mean? Spinoza does not see a problem in holding that just as
human beings are mental and physical beings, a substance can also be mental
and physical. As Viljanen says: “a substance can be conceived under many
different aspects, can have several objective essential features, many basic ways
of being.”50 Since each being must be conceived under some attributes, modes
must also be conceived under some attribute. They are modes of an objective
feature of substance.

IV. Relations and Causality Between Substances
Merely from the definitions and axioms already stated, Spinoza will derive
Propositions II and IV. Spinoza states in Proposition II that “two substances
having different attributes have nothing in common with one another.”51 Note that
Spinozaʼs argument for one substance depends on three facts, the last of which
depends on this proposition:
1) That God exists. (This is independent of there being more than two
attributes) (Proposition VII, Proposition XI)

49

Viljanen, Spinozaʼs Ontology, 66. From Della Rocca, Spinozaʼs Substance Monism, 18, 28-29.
Cf. Della Rocca, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza, 9-17.
50
Ibid.
51
Ethics, I, Proposition II. C I.410.
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2) That God has all attributes. (This is satisfied as long as Godʼs having
infinite attributes entails his having all attributes.) (Proposition VIII,
Proposition IX)
3) No two distinct substances can have an attribute in common. (Does not
depend on any considerations of the number of attributes) (Proposition IIV)
This proposition is clearly targeted at a particular medieval view of the distinction
between the essence of God and of the world. Maimonides says that the
difference in their essences is so great, that no attribute can be predicated of
them in any related sense:
When they ascribe to God essential attributes, these so-called
essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of
other things, and should not have any similarity to the attributes of
other things, and should according to their own opinion not be
included in one and the same definition, just as there is no similarity
between the essence of God and that of other beings.52
Wolfson interprets Spinoza as saying that: “When the same attributes, predicated
of two substances, are homonymous terms, used in absolutely different and
unrelated senses, the predication of these attributes does not imply any real
relationship in the essence of the two substances.”53 This fits in well with what
Spinoza held as an axiom in the Short Treatise: “Things that have different
attributes, as well as those that belong to different attributes have nothing in
themselves the one from the other.”54 Wolfson rightly advises us to think of
Spinozaʼs usage of the term attribute here in the sense of predicates. This
interpretation fits in well with what both Curley and Bennett say about the
opening propositions.55 As Curley repeatedly emphasizes,56 an objection that
was brought up by Leibniz may help us to understand the manner in which
Spinoza is thinking about substances and shared-attributes. The objection Curley
is referring to is that “two substances might have some attributes in common and
others which were distinctive of each one (e.g., substance A has attributes C and
D, substance B has attributes C and E).57 Curley points out that this objection
rests on the assumption that a substance may have more than one attribute. This
gives us reason to think that Spinoza is beginning by following the Cartesian
conception of substance in which “To each substance there belongs one
52

Moreh Nebukim, I, 56. Maimonides goes on to say: “this is a decisive proof that there is, in no
way or sense, anything common to the attributes predicated of God, and those used in reference
to ourselvesʼ they have only the same names, and nothing else is common to them.”
53
Ibid.
54
C 151. Axiom IV of the Appendix to the Short Treatise.
55
See Ethics, I, Proposition V.
56
C I.410 n. 8, also BGM, 15. Curley has repeatedly referred to this objection by Leibniz.
57
Ibid.
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principal attribute; in the case of mind, this is thought, and in the case of body it is
extension”:
A substance may indeed be known through any attribute at all; but
each substance has one principal property which constitutes its
nature and essence, and to which all its other properties are
referred. Thus extension in length, breadth and depth constitutes
the nature of corporeal substance; and thought constitutes the
nature of thinking substance. Everything else which can be
attributed to body presupposes extension, and is merely a mode of
an extended thing; and similarly, whatever we find in the mind is
simply one of the various modes of thinking.58
Indeed, this line of interpretation seems to fit very well. Bennett also agrees that
this fixes the apparent gap that Leibniz noticed, since Spinoza does not even
speak of the possibility of a substance having more than one attribute until
Proposition IX. Thus, Bennett says that, “until then he is speaking in terms of the
concept of a one-attribute substance.”59 The language used by Spinoza in the
demonstration of Proposition VIII as contrasted with Proposition IX justifies this
interpretation.
Spinoza next says in Proposition III that “if things have nothing in common
with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other.”60 Spinoza draws
this proposition out of Axioms IV and V.
Axiom IV: The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves,
the knowledge of its cause.
Axiom V: Things that have nothing in common with one another
also cannot be understood through one another, or the concept of
the one does not involve the concept of the other.61
In light of these axioms, we might want to phrase this proposition as: “when
things have nothing in common (i.e. things whose concepts cannot be
understood through each other), one cannot be the cause of the other.” Surely
this has to be what Spinoza means in this axiom from the Short Treatise: “What
has nothing in itself from another thing can also not be the cause of the existence
of such another thing.”62 H. A. Wolfson puts it best when he says of Axioms IV
and V that:
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Starting, therefore, with his own premise that God acts by
necessity, he argues against the mediaevals63 that if Godʼs nature
be essentially different from the nature of the world, He could not be
the cause of the world.64
Thus, Spinoza thinks that it is a contradiction to say that a divine nature that is
homonymous with the nature of the world, and still bears any conceptual (and
thus, causal) relation with it. This contradiction is evident from the fact that an
overwhelmingly popular medieval view stated that divine nature and the nature of
the world were absolutely different, yet the world was produced by a process of
emanation from the divine nature. Spinoza was well aware of the extreme
weakness of divine creation, noting the eagerness of medievals to impose
immaterial intermediary causes between God and the world.

V. The Identity of Indiscernibles
Spinoza states in Proposition IV: “Two or more distinct things are distinguished
from one another, either by a difference in the attributes of the substances or by
a difference in their affections.”65 In this proposition he is giving his own version
of the identity of indiscernibles. Two things are distinguished from one another
either by what basic kind of thing they are, or in a relational sense that isnʼt basic.
The concept of an extended thing on any basic level is only extension, and of a
thinking thing, only thought. Thus, it is impossible to distinguish two things whose
qualities are identical. His argument would look something like this:
1. Everything in Nature is differentiated by a basic difference of attributes or
by a non-basic and qualitative difference in modes.
2. Therefore, the conceptual content of any two things, conceived under the
same attribute, involves nothing but that attribute. (i.e. the conceptual
content of an extended thing involves only extension)
3. It follows that nothing could distinguish two things with exactly the same
qualities (conceptually, via the attribute).66
4. The two things are then really the same thing.
5. Therefore, there exists only one thing.
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Spinoza thinks it obvious that nothing exists external to the intellect except
substances and modes, and therefore there is nothing else by which they are
distinguished from one another. It follows that nothing can be distinguished from
God and still have something in common with Him. The two would have to be
either absolutely different or absolutely identical.

VI. The No-Shared Attribute Thesis
Spinoza asserts in Proposition V that “in nature there cannot be two substances
of the same nature or attribute.”67 Spinoza had formulated an earlier version of
this proposition, in which he says that “there are no two equal substances”68 His
proof runs as follows: “Every substance is perfect in its kind.69 For if there were
two equal substances, then they would necessarily have to limit one another, and
consequently, would not be infinite.”70 The demonstration of Proposition V is as
follows:
If there were two or more distinct substances, they would have to
be distinguished from one another either by a difference in their
attributes, or by a difference in their affections (by Proposition IV). If
only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that
there is only one of the same attribute. But if by a difference in their
affections, then since a substance is prior in nature to its affections
(by Proposition I), if the affections are put to one side and [the
substance] is considered in itself, i.e. (by Definition III and Axiom
VI), considered truly, one cannot be conceived to be distinguished
from another, i.e. (by Proposition IV), there cannot be many, but
only one [of the same nature or attribute], q.e.d.71
The no-shared attribute thesis is based off of Spinozaʼs identity of indiscernibles,
which we saw in the previous proposition. Two things are identical if there is no
feature by which they differ. If two things are distinct, some feature must
differentiate them. With regard to substances, attributes and modes are the only
entities that could differentiate them. But what justification does Spinoza have for
putting the affections to one side when considering substances? An appealing
answer has been given by Viljanen:
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By remarking that ʻa substance is prior in nature to its affections,ʼ
Spinoza is reminding us that distinguishing a substance by its
modes would amount to a situation in which a substance is
individuated by and conceived through something external to it (i.e.,
external to its essence); this would be at odds with the very
definition of substance, which, as we have seen, characterizes a
substance as a self-supporting entity, and one that does not require
anything external to be conceived. Moreover, on this point Spinoza
is in accordance with more or less the entire Western tradition.72
Since modes canʼt distinguish two substances, the attributes are the only other
possibility left. But the attributes fare no better at distinguishing substances
either. If we take any attribute, and if two substances shared that attribute, then it
cannot be that attribute that differentiates the two substances. Given the identity
of indiscernibles, the two substances are in fact identical. The identity of
attributes amounts to the identity of substances.

VII. Leibnizʼs Objection
In Leibnizʼs remarks on Spinozaʼs Ethics, he notes the following concerning the
demonstration of Proposition V:
I reply that a paralogism seems to lurk here. For two substances
can be distinguished by attributes, and yet have some common
attribute, provided they also have in addition some which are
peculiar. For example, A and B; the attribute of the one being c d,
and of the other, d e.73
Leibniz is asking, why canʼt it be the case that two substances, A and B, have
opposing attributes, c and e, but share the attribute d? If they can, then they are
distinct entities. It is up to Spinoza to show that substances with multiple
attributes canʼt share one of their attributes. This is a very powerful objection, and
many have taken it as conclusive in refuting Proposition V, one of the most
central doctrines in Spinozaʼs metaphysics. Indeed, if this objection holds, it
would leave us in a sorry state of affairs.
Viljanen has provided a useful interpretation of this issue. First of all, as
countless scholars have noted, it might be the case that Spinoza overlooked the
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possibility of this objection. This seems odd, since this objection is nearly a
universal concern of his readers. This implies that we should consider what
Spinoza was thinking when he wrote this proposition. Viljanen points to the fact
that Spinoza holds that “essences are highly individual, unique to their
possessors.”74 Consider Definition II of Part II of the Ethics:
I say that to the essence of any thing belongs that which, being
given, the thing is necessarily posited and which, being taken away,
the thing is necessarily taken away; or that without which the thing
can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be
conceived without the thing.75
What is relevant for Proposition V is that Spinoza says that an essence cannot
be nor be conceived without its possessor. This may explain the line of thought
Spinoza had in Proposition V. Thus, Viljanen notes:
Given it, there cannot be two distinct things of the same essence;
and as attributes constitute essences, Spinoza is led to think that it
is impossible for two substances to share an attribute, because
whenever there is an attribute constituting an essence, we have a
particular substance without which the attribute could not exist.76
But, as Viljanen points out, Spinoza would have a hard time convincing
Cartesians that an attribute could not be or be conceived without a certain
substance. He suggests that Spinoza could rely on a widely accepted way of
conceiving essences and the definitions that express essences during the
seventeenth century. This conception is the view that “both attributes and
definitions express essences, and definitions do not involve any number of
individuals.”77
Michael Della Rocca has also provided a useful response to Leibnizʼs
objection.78 Spinoza accepts that “each attribute of a substance, independently of
any other attribute of that substance, is sufficient for conceiving of that
substance.”79 This follows when Spinozaʼs definition of attribute and his definition
of essence are combined. Since this is the case, Leibnizʼs objection faces a
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serious problem. Leibniz had said, two substances, A and B, can have opposing
attributes, c and e, but share an attribute, d. But this canʼt be right, for substance
A could not be conceived solely through attribute d as the substance that has
attribute d. This alone would not be enough to distinguish substance A from B.80
Instead, as Viljanen also argues, substance A would have to be conceived as the
substance with c and d, which would mean that the concept of a certain
substance with attribute d would require not only the concept of attribute d, but
also the concept of attribute c, and would thus be partly conceived through c.81
The problem with this is that is violates the conceptual barrier between attributes.
Conceiving a substance with a certain attribute would depend on
conceiving some other attribute. Thus, the conceptual
independence of attributes guarantees that the kind of situations
depicted in the objection cannot occur. An argument put in
epistemological terms thus seems to fare better than one based on
the doctrine of individual essences.82

VIII. Unity of Substance
In Proposition VI, Spinoza states that “one substance cannot be produced by
another substance.”83 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza sets out this proposition as
one which he will prove in order to explain what God is.84 Spinoza challenges his
opponents by saying: “If someone wishes to maintain the contrary, we ask
whether the cause which would have to produce this substance has the same
attributes as the one produced or not? Not the latter, for something cannot come
from Nothing. Therefore, the former. And then we ask again whether, in that
attribute which would be the cause of what is produced, there is as much
perfection as in what is produced, or more, or less? We say there cannot be less,
for the reasons already given. We also say there cannot be more, because then
these two would be limited, which is contrary to what we have just proven. So
there would have to be as much. Then there would be two equal substances,
which is clearly contrary to our preceding proof.”85 Spinozaʼs challenge states
that the proponent of the proposition that one substance can be produced by
another substance must either accept that the two substances share attributes or
do not share attributes. If the proponent of this view argues that the two
substances do not share attributes, then his argument is inherently flawed, for he
is proposing that nothing is the cause of the second substance.
80
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Since it cannot be the case that the two substances do not share attributes,
the proponent of this view is left with one option: that the two substances do
share attributes. However, this argument dissolves when we consider Spinozaʼs
identity of indiscernibles.86 Spinoza has already shown that nothing could
distinguish two things with exactly the same qualities. If two substances share an
attribute, then there is no quality within that attribute that differentiates the two.
This is why Spinoza objects that if one substance is said to produce another
substance, and the two share attributes, then we must ask whether the attribute
in question contains as much perfection as the one produced, or more, or less?
Spinoza denies that it can contain less, for every substance is infinitely perfect in
its kind.87 This is evident when we consider the second definition: “That thing is
said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by another of the same nature.”
He also denies that it can contain more, as the two would be limited. Again, the
proponent of this view is left with one option: that the two substances have as
much perfection in their shared attribute(s). This would mean that the two
substances are equal, which has already been shown to be absurd (by
Proposition V). Spinoza also rejects the possibility of one substance producing
another by showing that it leads to an infinite regress. 88
Spinozaʼs first proof from the Ethics that one substance cannot be produced
by another substance simply argues that since two substances with different
attributes have nothing in common (Proposition II) and if things have nothing in
common, one cannot be the cause of the other (Proposition III), one substance
cannot produce another substance that has different attributes. And since it has
already been shown that there cannot be two or more substances that share an
attribute (Proposition V), one substance cannot be produced by another
substance. In the corollary, Spinoza states that it follows from this argument that
a substance cannot be produced by anything else. Indeed, using the proof
Spinoza just gave that one substance cannot be produced by another substance,
along with the first axiom, that “whatever is, is either in itself or in another,” we
can conclude that substance is not in another. This conclusion will serve as the
basis for Spinozaʼs proposition that it pertains to the nature of a substance to
exist. I have given the argument in a deductive proof below:
1. In nature there is nothing except substances and their affections. (Axiom I,
Definition III, Definition V)
2. Substance is prior in nature to its affections. (Proposition I)
3. Substance cannot be produced by another substance. (Proposition VI)
4. Therefore, substance cannot be produced by anything else.
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To give even more strength to the corollary above, Spinoza presents an
alternative proof in his favorite style: ex absurdo contradictorio.89
1. The knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its
cause. (Axiom IV)
2. A substance is conceived through itself, and its concept does not require
the concept of any other thing, from which it must be formed. (Definition
III)
3. If a substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of it
would depend on the knowledge of its cause. (by 1)
4. Therefore, it would not be a substance. (by 2 and 3)

IX. Essence and Existence90
Spinoza now turns to the existence of substance, and states in Proposition VII
that ”it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist.”91 In the Tractatus de
Intellectus Emendatione, Spinoza says:
If the thing is in itself, or, as is commonly said, is the cause of itself,
then it must be understood through its essence alone; but if it is not
89
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in itself, but requires a cause to exist, then it must be understood
through its proximate cause. For really, knowledge of the effect is
nothing but acquiring a more perfect knowledge of its cause.92
Since Spinoza has already shown that substance is not produced by anything
else, he states that the essence of substance must involve existence. In the
Ethics, the proposition that the essence of substance involves existence is
stunningly brief, as its proof is given in a single sentence, yet it is central in his
argument that one substance (God) necessarily exists.
The proof he gives in the Ethics is so simple that it can be deceiving. The
argument he gives there, with its logical dependencies given, runs as follows:
1. Whatever is, is either in itself or in another. (Axiom I)
2. Substance is not in another, for substance cannot be produced by
anything else. (Proposition VI, Corol.)
3. Therefore, substance must the cause of itself.
4. That which is the cause of itself is that whose essence involves existence.
(Definition I)
5. Therefore, it pertains to the nature of substance to exist. (Proposition VII)
In the Short Treatise Spinoza shows that anyone who holds that one substance
can produce another (contrary to the previous proposition) will end up in an
infinite regress: “If we wish to seek the cause of that substance which is the
principle of the things which proceed from its attribute, then we shall have to seek
in turn the cause of that cause, and then again, the cause of that cause, and so
on to infinity; so if we must stop somewhere (as we must), we must stop with this
unique substance.” 93 In both the TdIE and PPC, Spinoza clarifies the definition of
unique. In the TdIE he says: “For this entity is unique and infinite, that is, it is total
being, beyond which there is no being.”94 Then in the PPC, he gives a similar
description: “It should be noted here that it follows necessarily from the mere fact
that some thing involves necessary existence from itself (as God does) that it is
unique.”95
Taken together, these two passages bring out an important link between
Spinozaʼs refutation of the proposition that one substance can produce another
and his justification of the proposition that it pertains to the nature of substance to
exist, that is, the essence of substance involves existence. This further supports
the interpretation given by Wolfson that Spinoza utilizes the principle of the
identity of essence and existence in substance as an argument for the main
contention of the second chapter of the Short Treatise, which is to refute the view
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held by some medievals that there are two substances, God and the world, the
latter of which has no existence involved in its essence, inasmuch as it must
acquire existence through an act of creation or emanation.96
There is a parallel proposition in the first ʻAppendixʼ97 of the Short Treatise, in
which Spinoza says: “Existence belongs, by nature, to the essence of every
substance, so much so that it is impossible to posit in an infinite intellect the idea
of the essence of a substance which does not exist in Nature.”98

X. The Infinity of Substance
When Spinoza says that substance is infinite99 he means that it is unique100 and
thus not limited. This uniqueness and infinitude means that it cannot be given
positive description, as a description implies a limitation, determinatio negatio
est.101 Wolfson has pointed out that “to call a substance infinite in this sense is
like calling voice colorless.”102 To call a voice colorless does not imply any
negation of a property which it is expected to have, but rather an absolute
exclusion of voice from the world of color. In the same way, Wolfson tells us
“when substance is described as infinite in this sense, it means its absolute
96
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exclusion from any form of finitude, limitation, and description.”103 To call a
substance finite implies that it is comparable. A comparison can be made only
between like things, and thus a finite thing is included within a class of like things.
Consider what Maimonides says in the following passage:
Similarity is based on a certain relation between two things; if
between two things no relation can be found, there can be no
similarity between them, and there is no relation between two things
that have no similarity to each other; e.g., we do not say this heat is
similar to that colour, or this voice is similar to that sweetness…You
must know that two things of the same kind—i.e., whose essential
properties are the same, distinguished from each other by
greatness or smallness, strength and weakness, etc.—are
necessarily similar.104
Spinoza clearly picks up on this when he is defining that which is “finite in its own
kind” (Definition II). By this definition a thing is finite because it suffers from
description. What this means is that a thing can only be described in terms that
necessarily limit it. Finite things share a similarity, as described by Maimonides,
to other things of the same kind by which they are compared. Hence, Spinoza
says in his definition:
That thing is said to be finite in its own kind that can be limited by
another of the same nature. For example, a body is called finite
because we always conceive another that is greater. Thus a
103
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thought is limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a
thought nor a thought by a body.105
As opposed to being finite in its kind, Spinoza also mentions that which is infinite
in its kind. A thing that is infinite in its kind has the highest degree of the shared
essential property of its kind, as opposed to being unique and having
incomparable qualities. Being infinite in its kind is essentially inferior to being
absolutely infinite. Thus, Spinoza says: “If something is only infinite in its own
kind, we can deny infinite attributes of it.”106
Absolute infinitude is unique and incomparable such that there is no kind to
which an absolutely infinite thing belongs. In other words, it is its own kind.
Spinoza, in describing in what respect God is unique or sui generis,107 says:
“Insofar as we conceive that there cannot be more than one of the same nature,
he is unique.”108 That which is absolutely infinite is its own genus, rather than
being the highest degree of a genus. Hence, Spinoza says: “If something is
absolutely infinite, whatever expresses essence and involves no negation
pertains to its essence.”109 Since there is no such negation, Spinoza concludes:
“Between the finite and the infinite there is no relation, so that the difference
between God and the greatest and most excellent created thing is no other than
that between God and the least created thing.”110
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza sets out to demonstrate: “That there is no
limited substance, but that every substance must be infinitely perfect in its kind,
viz. that in Godʼs infinite intellect no substance can be more perfect than that
which already exists in Nature.”111 Spinoza again gives a challenge, this time to
the proponent of the view that there can be a limited substance, and asks
whether this substance is limited through itself, or through its cause. Spinoza
objects that it canʼt be the case that a substance, which is necessarily that which
is in itself, is able to limit itself: “It did not limit itself, for being unlimited it would
have had to change its whole essence.”112 In other words, that which is causa sui
could not possibly change its nature and become less powerful or less infinite. In
the first set of objections to the Meditations of Descartes, Johannes Caterus
quotes a strikingly similar argument given by Suarez:
Every limitation proceeds from some cause; therefore if something
is limited and finite this is because its cause was either unable or
unwilling to endow it with more greatness or perfection; and hence
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if something derives its existence from itself, and not from some
cause, it is indeed unlimited and infinite.113
In Spinozaʼs challenge, he uses the exact same words when addressing the
proponent of limited substances who accepts that a substance is limited through
its cause, which is necessarily God: “If it is limited through its cause, that must be
either because its cause could not or would not give more.”114 Spinoza rejects
both of these possibilities, for to say “that he could not have given more is
contrary to his omnipotence.115 That he could have, but would not, smacks of
envy, which is not in any way in God, who is all goodness and fullness.”116 The
reason Spinoza doesnʼt reproduce this argument in the Ethics is that it depends
upon his proof of the existence of God, which doesnʼt occur until Proposition XI,
whereas in the Short Treatise Spinoza has already demonstrated in the previous
chapter “That God Is.”
Spinozaʼs proof in the Ethics that substance is infinite is by ex absurdo
contradictorio. We know from Spinozaʼs definitions and demonstrations that there
cannot be more than one substance having the same attribute (Proposition V)
and that existence belongs to the essence of substance (Proposition VII). Since
this is the case, Spinoza argues, then the existence that pertains to the essence
of substance must either be finite or infinite existence. The existence of
substance cannot be finite, for that which is finite in its kind “can be limited by
another of the same nature.” If it were the case that substance existed as finite, it
would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature or essence,
whose essence also involves existence. But this would mean that there would
exist two substances of the same attribute, which is an absurdity by Proposition
V. It follows from Spinozaʼs proof that substance cannot exist as finite, along with
his proof that the essence of substance involves existence, that it exists as
infinite. In the first scholium that follows this proof, Spinoza says that it follows
from the proof that existence pertains to the nature of substance alone that
substance is infinite. This is due to the fact that being infinite is an absolute
affirmation of the existence of some nature, whereas being finite is in part a
negation. Assuming a finite substance in part denies existence to the nature of
substance, which by Proposition VII is an absurdity.
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XI. Misconceptions of Substance
Spinoza gives a long scholium to account for misconceptions people may have
by this first unit of propositions.117 These misconceptions are largely due to the
fact that people judge things confusedly, especially by not being accustomed to
knowing things through their first causes.118 This error arises when one does not
distinguish between the modifications of substance and substance itself. In this
case, one does not truly understand how a thing is produced, and this is the
reason why they ascribe characteristics to substance that do not properly belong
to it. This false connection is due to an obscured kind of knowledge. Later in the
Ethics, Spinoza will link this to the imagination, which takes vague instances and
random experience (experientia vaga) acquired through the senses. This
ʻknowledgeʼ from singular things represented through the senses is “mutilated,
confused, and without order for the intellect.”119 This kind of knowledge is what
Spinoza refers to as “the only cause of falsity,”120 and when this inadequate
knowledge reigns alone there is a reversal of causes.121 This is why Spinoza
says: “So it happens that they fictitiously ascribe to substances the beginning
which they see that natural things have; for those who do not know the true
causes of things confuse everything and without any conflict of mind feign that
both trees and men speak, imagine that men are formed both from stones and
from seed, and that any form whatever is changed into any other.”122 Although
Spinozaʼs full discussion on this topic appears later in the Ethics, this statement
should be taken as an early note of caution not to obscure the order of causes by
letting the imagination rule the intellect. Although we can form ideas of certain
things which do not really exist outside of the intellect, for example, unicorns, the
essences of such things are ultimately contained in God, an infinite substance
that does exist. However, the truth of the existence of substance is contained
within its essence alone, and thus cannot be conceived except as existing. The
truth of Proposition VII is so clear, says Spinoza, that it shouldnʼt be necessary to
give a proof of it, for “if men would attend to the nature of substance, they would
have no doubt at all of the truth of Proposition VII. Indeed, this proposition would
be an axiom to everyone, and would be numbered among the common
notions.”123 Thus, if one has a clear and distinct idea of substance, yet doubts
whether it exists, this is the same as saying that one has a true idea, yet doubts
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whether it is false. Alternatively, if one holds that substance is created, this is the
same as holding that a false idea has become true. To clarify why this is the
case, if it is the case that substance is created, then there was a time in the past
that substance had no existence. If substance had no existence, then the idea of
it was a false idea until substance was created, which means that a false idea
became a true idea. While it is not an absurdity to think this way about finite
things that have an essence which is neutral with respect to their existence, it is
an absurdity to think this way about an eternal and infinite substance whose
essence necessarily involves existence. This is precisely the error that results
from the reversal of causes. Nothing more absurd can be conceived than
doubting a clear and distinct idea or substance or maintaining that substance is
created, and thus existence of substance (like its essence) is an eternal truth.

XII. Relation of Substance and Attribute
Spinoza now moves to the relation between substance and attribute. Recall that
Definition IV states that an attribute is “what the intellect perceives of a
substance, as constituting its essence.”124 Spinoza says that it follows from this
definition alone that “the more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes
belong to it.”125 This proof only holds if we can use the terms essence and reality
interchangeably. This is clearly the case for Spinoza, as in the Preface to the
Fourth Part of the Ethics, he states: “By perfection in general I shall, as I have
said, understand reality, i.e., the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and
produces an effect, having no regard to its duration.”126 Spinoza also states: “By
reality and perfection I understand the same thing.”127 Thus, he is saying that the
more essence each thing has, the more attributes belong to it. In the Short
Treatise, Spinoza similarly says:
For of a being which has some essence, [some] attributes must be
predicated, and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more
attributes one must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its
attributes must also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a
perfect being.128
Wolfson rightly notes that the proposition as it stands is incomplete, as only the
major premise is given.129 However, Spinoza reproduces this proposition in both
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Epistle IX130 and the scholium to Proposition X,131 adding the minor premise and
conclusion. The full argument runs as follows:
1. The more reality or being each thing has, the more attributes
belong to it (Definition IV).
2. Substance possesses infinite reality or being (Proposition VIII).
3. Therefore, substance has infinite attributes (Proposition X,
Scholium).132
Here, the very complicated interpretive issue arises in Spinoza, namely what to
make of his statement that there are infinite attributes. The issue itself is too large
and complicated to give a detailed account of here, as that discussion is not the
purpose of this paper. However, the issue is important enough not to pass by
without comment. There is certainly a large division among scholars of how to
interpret the issue.
Abraham Wolf has provided an excellent discussion of the topic.133 According
to Wolf, the doctrine of an infinite number of attributes has been misconstrued by
commentators and expositors. It is true that Spinoza speaks of God or substance
and consisting of infinite attributes, and this ʻinfiniteʼ refers to the number of
attributes. However, Wolf states: “It is a sheer blunder to translate Spinozaʼs
infinite by innumerable. And it is this mistranslation that is at the root of the
trouble. By infinite Spinoza means complete or all.”134 Wolfʼs evidence for this
view is Spinozaʼs repeated positive use of the term infinite and his usage of the
term perfect (i.e., complete) or all as the equivalent of infinite. For instance, in the
Short Treatise, Spinoza says: “Nature is a being of which all attributes are
predicated.”135 Wolf argues that nobody could think of describing two attributes
as innumerable attributes, though they may well be all the attributes. In his
interpretation, Spinoza does not posit innumerable attributes at all: “He only knew
of two attributes, and as a cautious thinker, he had, of course, to allow for the
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possibility of other attributes unknown to man, since Spinoza did not regard man
as the measure of all things. He accordingly posited ʻinfinite or all the attributes,ʼ
in the sense of ʻcertainly two, possibly more.ʼ”136 That Spinoza is thinking in this
manner is further reinforced by what he says in the third part of the Ethics: “The
Body cannot determine the Mind to thinking, and the Mind cannot determine the
Body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything else).”137
That when Spinoza says substance or God has infinite attributes he means all
attributes is further supported by the way in which he uses the term infinite in the
Ethics.138 For example, in Proposition XVI Spinoza says: “infinitely many things…
(i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect).”139 Also, in the scholium
to Proposition XVII, he says: “infinitely many things…i.e., all things.”140 Also, in
the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza equates the statement that “God can think
infinitely many things” with “all things.”141 It is quite clear, then, that Spinoza uses
the term infinite to mean all or everything.142
Next, Spinoza states that “each attribute of a substance must be conceived
through itself.”143 Since an attribute is what the intellect perceives of substance
as constituting its essence (Definition IV), it must (by Definition III) be conceived
through itself. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says:
Of attributes, which are of a self-existing being; these require no
genus, or anything else through which they are better understood or
explained; for since they, as attributes of a being existing through
itself, exist through themselves, they are also known through
themselves.144
A difficulty arises from Spinozaʼs scholium to Proposition X, where he says:
It is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be
really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the
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other), we still can not infer from that that they constitute two
beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself,
since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and
one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the
reality, or being of substance.145
The difficulty is how we can say that there are many attributes and only one
substance? The simple solution to this problem might be to say that substance is
identical with the many attributes. But this only creates a more menacing
problem, namely that doing so is to treat substance as an aggregate, which goes
against the indivisibility of substance.146 The problem we are left to solve is
stated by Edwin Curley as follows:
How can we remain true to Spinozaʼs language, which regularly
speaks of substance as a complex, in which each of the attributes
is an element, without suggesting that substance could somehow
be decomposed into various elements, or that some of these
elements might exist apart from the others?147

XIII. Spinozaʼs Proofs of the Existence of God
Wolfson has categorized these first ten propositions of the Ethics as a challenge
to medieval philosophers.148 According to Wolfson, Spinozaʼs starting point in this
challenge was his definition of God at the beginning of the Ethics as a
reproduction of a definition found in a standard work of a popular medieval
Jewish philosopher.149
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At this point, in order to give both a summary of the first ten propositions and
the purpose they serve for Spinozaʼs proof of the existence of God, I will provide
a long quotation from Wolfson describing Spinozaʼs method in his challenge.
According to Wolfson, Spinoza addresses his opponents as follows:
All you medievals,150 to whatever school of thought you may
belong, have builded your philosophies on the conception of a God
epitomized by you in a formal definition which contains four
characteristic expressions. You say that God is (1) an ens in the
highest sense of the term, by which you mean that He is a being
who exists necessarily. You also say that He is (2) ʻabsolutely
infinite,ʼ by which you mean that He is (3) ʻa substance consisting of
infinite attributes,ʼ (4) ʻeach of which expresses eternal and infinite
essenceʼ (Def. VI). God so defined you call absolute substance; you
differentiate Him from the world which you call conditional
substance, and then you declare that the relation between the
absolute substance and the conditional substance is like that of
creator to created. In opposition to you, I deny at the very outset the
existence of a God outside the world and of His relation to the world
as creator. Still, unaccustomed to dispute about mere names, I
shall retain your own term substance as a philosophic surrogate to
the pious name God, and in your own terms I am going to unfold a
new conception of the nature of God and of His relation to the
world…To begin with, I shall abandon your distinction between
absolute substance and conditional substance, but shall use the
term substance in that restrictive sense in which you use the
expression absolute substance. Then, what you call conditional
substance,151 or the world, I shall call mode. Furthermore, unlike
this that the Cabalists designated God by the term Infinite (En Sof), to indicate that the
perfections which are to be found in Him are infinite in the three senses in which we have
mentioned.” (Ikkarim, II, 25) God is defined as infinite in the number of attributes, and each
attribute is infinite in time and perfection. The full exposition of this view in relation to Spinoza can
be found in Wolfson, I, 116-119.
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you, I shall not describe the relation of substance to mode as that of
creator to created, but rather as that of whole to part, or, to be more
exact, as that of universal to particular (Defs. II and V; Axioms I and
II; Prop. I). The reason for my disagreeing with you on the question
of the causal relation between God and the world is that I find your
doctrine of creation, however you may try to explain it, an untenable
hypothesis (Props. II-VI). Barring this difference between us, a
difference which, I must confess, is fundamental and far-reaching in
its effect, I am going to describe my substance in all those terms
which you make use of in describing your God. Like your God, my
substance is (1) the highest ens, for existence appertains to its
nature (Prop. VII). (2) It is also absolutely infinite (Prop. VIII). (3)
Furthermore, it consists of infinite attributes (Prop. IX). (4) Finally,
each of its attributes expresses eternal and infinite essence (Prop.
X). I have thus described my substance in all those terms which
you use in your formal definition of God. Consequently, as I am now
to reproduce your proofs of the existence of God to prove the
existence of my substance, I shall bracket together the terms God
and substance and say: ʻGod, or substance consisting of infinite
attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence,
necessarily existsʼ (Prop. XI). Having made it clear by this time what
I mean by the term God, I am no longer afraid of being
misunderstood. Hereafter I shall drop the term substance and use
in its stead the term God. And so he does.152
Spinoza asserts that: “God, or a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each
of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.”153 In the
Fifth Meditation, Descartes says: “Since I have been accustomed to distinguish
between essence and existence in everything else, I find it easy to persuade
myself that existence can also be separated from the essence of God, and hence
that God can be thought of as not existing.”154 However, in the First Set of
Replies, Descartes removes the difficulty by demonstrating that it is through
Intelligence, which, while immaterial like God himself, according to one of the prevailing views, is
of a less perfect order, inasmuch as by its nature it is only a possible being, having a cause for its
existence. The thought of this Intelligence, which is said to possess a dual nature, objectifies itself
in another Intelligence and a sphere. So the process goes on until at a certain stage crass matter
appears which is the basis of the sublunar world. The world thus possesses imperfections which
are not found in the original thinking essence of God. In the language of Spinoza these mediaeval
contrasts between God and the world are expressed in the phrases ʻinfinite substanceʼ and ʻfinite
substance.ʼ It is Spinoza's purpose in his discussion of ʻWhat God Isʼ to abolish this dualism
between the thinking essence of God and the material, or extended, essence of the world, to
identify God with the wholeness of nature, and to conclude ʻthat we posit extension as an attribute
of God.ʼ" Wolfson, I, 96-97.
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Godʼs necessary existence as opposed to his possible existence that his
essence is not distinguished from existence: “Possible existence is contained in
the concept or idea of everything we clearly and distinctly understand; but in no
case is necessary existence contained, except in the case of the idea of God.”155
Spinoza adopts the same method as Descartes in the Cogitata Metaphysica,
where he defines Being as: “Whatever, when it is clearly and distinctly perceived,
we find to exist necessarily, or at least to be able to exist.”156 He goes on to say
that from this definition, or description, “it is easy to see that being should be
divided into being which exists necessarily by its own nature, or whose essence
involves existence, and being whose essence involves only possible
existence.”157 It is the necessary existence as he classified in the Cogitata
Metaphysica that Spinoza holds to belong to God.
The idea behind all of Spinozaʼs proofs of the existence of God158 is that if it is
granted that anything is actual, then it must be granted that God is of necessity
actual. In Epistle XII, Spinoza clarifies that the force of this argument lies not in
the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, “but only in the supposition that
things which do not exist necessarily by their own nature are not determined to
exist by a thing which does exist necessarily by its own nature.”159 Indeed,
Spinozaʼs first proof is ex absurdo contradictorio.

XIV. First Proof
The first proof tells us that God is substance, and since his existence is selfdetermined, he necessarily exists. What is unexpressed is the postulate that
there is something, a modal being, which exists and implies a self-determined
substance.160 That Spinoza did not include this in his proof in the Ethics is due to
the fact that it goes without saying that by denying the existence of anything, you
are asserting that you exist.161 And by asserting your existence as a modal being
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you are implying the existence of substance. Spinoza holds that everyone admits
that something is real, for even if one doubts the existence of everything
including oneʼs own existence, one must exist in order to doubt oneʼs own
existence. Since this is the case, it follows that God has necessary existence.
If we were to take any existing thing from experience, and think out all that its
being involves, its reality will either expand, and force itself into being, or it will
dissolve until you are forced to conceive the whole nature of things, realizing that
the experience that was a starting point is only a fragment within the whole.162
The finite starting point vanishes and in its place is the necessity, complete, and
infinite whole that is Spinozaʼs God. That God is not one amongst other selfconditioned things gives Spinozaʼs argument weight, as the whole is implied by
each and every piece of modal existence. Thus, Spinoza says that unless the
whole is, nothing can be nor be conceived.163 Thus, as Joachim points out,
because there is nothing real except God on which his being could depend, he is
causa sui, and therefore not contingent. Further, his existence must be
conditioned by himself or identical with his essence. To deny his existence is to
deny that anything has existence.
According to Joachim, the ontological argument understood in this way avoids
Kantʼs criticism.164
If you apply the ontological argument to anything except the whole
and unique system of experience, Kantʼs criticism is unanswerable.
If existence is necessarily included in the idea of God, then ʻGod
must existʼ is an analytical judgment. It is contradictory to think the
subject without the predicate: but—as Kant pointed out—it is not in
the least contradictory to think neither subject nor predicate. You
cannot conceive God without conceiving him to exist, if existence is
included in the content of his idea: but you need not conceive God
at all. But the cogency of this reasoning disappears the moment
that God stands for the whole Reality. Then you cannot get rid of
the subject of your analytical judgment without removing that which
all and any experience involves: you cannot refuse to conceive God
without ceasing to think or doubt or feel, in short, without ceasing to
be. Hence, there is obviously a fundamental connexion between the
uniqueness and the self-determined existence of God.165
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XV. Second Proof
The second proof makes use of the principle of sufficient reason. Spinoza clearly
defines the principle of sufficient reason in the PPC, the eleventh axiom states:
“Nothing exists of which it cannot be asked, what is the cause, or reason, why it
exists.”166 The note to this axiom says:
Since existing is something positive, we cannot say that it has
nothing as its cause (by Axiom VII).167 Therefore, we must assign
some positive cause, or reason, why [a thing] exists—either an
eternal one, i.e., one outside the thing itself, or an internal one, i.e.,
one comprehended in the nature and definition of the existing thing
itself.168
This is the same reasoning that underlies the second axiom in the Ethics: “What
cannot be conceived through another, must be conceived through itself.”169 The
principle of sufficient reason is also given by Spinoza at the beginning of his
second proof, where he says:
For each thing there must be assigned a cause, or reason, as much
for its existence as for its nonexistence. For example, if a triangle
exists, there must be a reason or cause why it exists; but if it does
not exist, there must also be a reason or cause which prevents it
from existing, or which takes its existence away.170
Spinozaʼs application of the principle of sufficient reason in the Ethics is more
radical than his axiom in the PPC, where it had only been all existing things that
require a reason or cause for there existence, whereas in the Ethics both existing
and non-existing things require a reason or cause that explain why it is that they
exist or do not. Further, Spinoza implies that non-existing things are prevented by
a cause or reason from existing.171
A thingʼs existence must either be: 1) logically impossible, 2) logically
possible, or 3) logically necessary. A thingʼs existence is logically impossible
when a cause or reason prevents it from existing. For example, a ʻsquare circleʼ
is logically impossible, since it contains an inherent contradiction. Thus, the
reason or cause that prevent them from existing is internal rather than external.
Things which have an essence that contains no contradiction, or, in other words,
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are logically possible, exist as long as there is no external cause that prevent
them from existing. This contains all of the ordinary objects, or modes, of our
everyday experience. One might object that since there are so many competing
essences that contain no internal contradiction, why isnʼt it the case that they are
all actually existing. The answer is that since their existence depends on external
causes, i.e. the order of things external, they are only actualized if the order of
things opens up a spot for them. The reason for their existence or nonexistence
is in the order of things rather than in their essence. Finally, a thingʼs existence is
logically necessary if there isnʼt a reason or cause which prevents it from
existing. The difference between logically necessary existents and logically
possible ones is that while it is the case that a certain logically possible thing
exists of necessity, this existence only applies to a certain ʻslotʼ where things
external allow for it to exist. While it exists of necessity now, its existence does
not follow from its essence, but from the order of causes outside its existence. It
does not have the same necessary existence as that which is logically
necessary, since it is dependent upon things other than itself to exist.
Hence, Spinoza says: “The reason why a circle or triangle exists, or why it
does not exist, does not follow from the nature of these things, but from the order
of the whole of corporeal Nature. For from this [order] it must follow either that the
triangle necessarily exists now or that it is impossible for it to exist now.”172
While the essence of a logically impossible thing prevents it from existing, the
essence of a logically necessary thing involves existence. Since this is the case,
Spinoza argues, God must necessarily exist if there is no reason or cause
preventing his existence.
Such a cause or reason preventing Godʼs existence would have to either be in
Godʼs essence or outside of it. If the cause or reason is external, it is either a
substance of a different nature or the same nature. However, if it were of the
same nature, that would prove that God exists, since there is nothing distinct
from God to prevent his existence. We have already shown that in nature there
cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute (Proposition
V). If the substance is of a different nature, then it would have nothing in common
with God, as two substances having different attributes have nothing in common
with one another (Proposition II). Further, two substances that have nothing in
common cannot be understood through one another (by Axiom V), and thus the
other substance isnʼt capable of preventing God from existing. Thus, since the
cause or reason isnʼt external to God, then if God doesnʼt exist, it must be
internal. But it is an absurdity to affirm that a Being absolutely infinite and
supremely perfect has an essence which involves a contradiction. Therefore,
there is no reason or cause which takes Godʼs existence away, and hence God
necessarily exists.
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XVI. Third Proof
Spinozaʼs next demonstration reflects Descartesʼ cosmological proof from the
Third Meditation. In that proof, Descartes reasons from effect to cause, or, from
our consciousness of our own existence to the existence of God.173 His argument
begins with the inquiry of whether I, who have an idea of a being more perfect
than myself, could exist if such a being didnʼt exist. He then presents the
question: “From whom, in that case, would I derive my existence? From myself,
presumably, or from my parents, or from some other being less perfect than
God?”174 Descartesʼ conclusion is that my existence must derive from God. With
this principle of God as the source of our beginning to exist, there is also the
principle of preservation, or conservation. This addition allows the proponent of a
cosmological argument to respond to the objection that the universe itself is
eternal and has no beginning. Thus, Descartes states: “It is clear enough that an
infinite regress is impossible here, especially since I am dealing not just with the
cause that has produced me in the past, but also and more importantly with the
cause that preserves me at the present moment.”175 A traditional cosmological
argument would run as follows:176
1) Everything that begins to exist into existence has a cause.
2) The universe began to exist.
3) Therefore, the universe has a cause.
In the Third Meditation, Descartes holds that effects must contain as much reality
as their causes, and since we have an idea of God, we cannot be the cause of
this idea. Further, only an infinitely perfect being could be the cause of this idea.
Spinoza utilizes Descartesʼ reasoning in his third proof. We have an idea of our
own existence as finite beings and an idea of Godʼs existence as an infinite
being. Now, there are three possibilities as to the truth of these ideas:
1) They are both false, and thus nothing exists.
2) Only the idea of our own existence is true, which entails that “what now
necessarily exists are only finite beings.”
3) They are both true, and thus “an absolutely infinite Being exists.”
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The first possibility is rejected, since we exist. The second possibility is also
rejected, because “if what now necessarily exists are only finite beings, then finite
beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite Being. But this, as is known
through itself is absurd.” The importance of Descartesʼ argument becomes
evident:
If I derived my existence from myself [and were independent of
every other being], then I should neither doubt nor want, nor lack
anything at all; for I should have given myself all the perfections of
which I have any idea, and thus I should myself be God. I must not
suppose that the items I lack would be more difficult to acquire than
those I now have. On the contrary, it is clear that, since I am a
thinking thing…it would have been far more difficult for me to
emerge out of nothing than merely to acquire knowledge of which I
am ignorant…If I had derived my existence from myself, which is a
greater achievement, I should certainly not have denied myself the
knowledge in question, which is something much easier to acquire,
or indeed any of the attributes which I perceive to be contained in
the idea of God; for none of them seem any harder to achieve. And
if any of them were harder to achieve, they would certainly appear
so to me, if I had indeed got all my other attributes from myself,
since I should experience a limitation of my power in this respect.177
Spinoza gives this same argument in his favorite style, ex absurdo contradictorio.
For if we exist and God doesnʼt exist, then we have existence through ourselves,
as Descartes says: “I derived my existence from myself.” If this is the case, then
the idea which we have of our own existence is more powerful than the idea we
have of Godʼs existence, since “to be able not to exist is to lack power, and
conversely, to be able to exist is to have power.”178 But we have an idea of
ourselves as finite beings and God as an infinite being. Thus, the possibility that
only the idea of our own existence is true is contradictory. Since the first two
possibilities have been shown to be false, the last one must be true, namely that
God, a being absolutely infinite, necessarily exists.179

XVII. Fourth Proof
Spinozaʼs fourth proof is more interesting than his third, for he tells us: “I wanted
to show Godʼs existence a posteriori, so that the demonstration would be
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perceived more easily—but not because Godʼs existence does not follow a priori
form the same foundation.”180 The purpose of the third proof is to give a simple
demonstration of a proof that can alternatively, and preferably, be arrived at a
priori.
Spinoza gives a simple outline of this ontological proof:
1) To be able to exist is power.
2) The more reality a thing has, the more power it has to exist.
3) Therefore, God, an absolutely infinite being, has, of himself, an absolutely
infinite power of existing.
4) From this it follows that God exists absolutely.181
At first sight, this proof seems quite obscure and unclear. For what, exactly, is the
definition of power? Spinoza answers this question for us in the Cogitata
Metaphysica, where he states that Godʼs power is not distinguished from his
essence:
Some claim that Godʼs Immensity is threefold: immensity of
essence, of power, and of presence;182 but that is foolish, for they
seem to distinguish between Godʼs essence and his power. But
others have also asserted the same thing more openly, when they
say that God is everywhere through his power, but not through his
essence183 —as if the power of God were distinguished from all his
attributes, or his infinite essence. Nevertheless it cannot be
anything else. For if it were something else, it would be either some
creature or something accidental to the divine essence, which the
divine essence could be conceived to lack. But both alternatives are
absurd. For if it were a creature, it would require the power of God
in order to be conserved, and so there would be an infinite regress.
And if it were something accidental, God would not be a most
simple being, contrary to what we have demonstrated above.184
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From this it is evident how Spinozaʼs proof is ontological, for it argues from the
essence of God, or, what is the same, his power, and concludes that he
necessarily exists. There is a similar argument found in Descartesʼ First Set of
Replies to Caterus:
When we attend to the immense power of this being, we shall be
unable to think of its existence as possible without also recognizing
that it can exist by its own power; and we shall infer from this that
this being does really exist and has existed from eternity, since it is
quite evident by the natural light that what can exist by its own
power always exists. So we shall come to understand that
necessary existence is contained in the idea of a supremely
powerful being, not by any fiction of the intellect, but because it
belongs to the true and immutable nature of such a being that it
exists.185
Spinoza notes that “there may be many who will not easily be able to see how
evident this demonstration is, because they have been accustomed to
contemplate only those things that flow from external causes.”186 In other words,
they contemplate things from effect to cause, rather than from cause to effect,
which is the nature of this proof. Such people see that things which quickly come
to be, or which are easily able to exist, also quickly perish. Likewise, they
conceive that things which are more complex do not exist as easily.
Spinoza says that this objection can be answered by noting that he is not
speaking of things which come to be from external causes, but rather of
substances that can be produced by no external cause. The objection only
applies to things which owe their existence to an external cause. Spinozaʼs
statement, “for things that come to be from external causes—whether they
consist of many parts or of few—owe all the perfection or reality they have to the
power of the external cause,” reflects what Descartes says in the Third
Meditation: “There must be at least as much [reality] in the cause as in the
effect.”187 Thus, the existence of things that come from an external cause arises
only from the perfection of that cause, and not from their own perfection. Any
perfection substance has is not owed to an external cause, and so its existence
must follow from its own essence. Spinoza concludes: “Hence its existence is
nothing but its essence.”188
The objection washes away because perfection assets the existence of a
thing, rather than limiting it, while imperfection does take it away. In fact, there is
nothing whose existence we can be more certain of than the existence of an
absolutely infinite, or perfect, Being, which Spinoza calls God. This proof “will be
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clear even to those who are only moderately attentive,” and since Godʼs essence
excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute perfection, all reasons of
doubting Godʼs existence will be removed.

XVIII. The Indivisibility of Substance
Spinoza now attends to the indivisibility of substance. In the Short Treatise,
Spinoza devotes the first chapter to the subject, ʻThat God Is,ʼ and the second
chapter to the subject, ʻWhat God Is.ʼ Similarly, now that he has demonstrated
that God exists in Proposition XI of the Ethics, the following propositions discuss
what God is, or, more specifically, what the nature of God is.189 Spinoza states in
Proposition XII: “No attribute of a substance can be truly conceived from which it
follows that the substance can be divided.”190 Proposition XII doesnʼt tell us that
an attribute canʼt be divided, since I can conceive of distinct modes of extension,
not just extension as a whole. Likewise, I can distinguish concepts of thought
from each other, and donʼt need to conceive of all thoughts as a whole. In the
Short Treatise, Spinoza states: “A thing composed of different parts must be such
that each singular part can be conceived and understood without the others.” 191
In the same passage Spinoza provides an illustration: “For example, in a clock
that is composed of many different wheels, cords, etc., I say that each wheel,
cord, etc., can be conceived and understood separately, without needing [the
understanding of] the whole as a whole.”192
However, while I can conceive of the attributes as divisible in this way, this
division doesnʼt imply that substance itself is divided. For example, when an
extended body is broken in two, substance itself is not broken in two, suffering
division. Spinoza is not an atomist,193 and the notion that substance, or the
whole, is the sum total of a finite number of divisible points is absolutely rejected
by him. This is evident from his statement in the Short Treatise:
Division, then, or being acted on, always happens in the mode, as
when we say that a man perishes, or is destroyed, that is only
understood of the man insofar as he is a composite being and
189
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mode of substance, and not the substance itself on which he
depends.194
The problem Spinoza is addressing is the continuum problem. This problem
states that since extension, space, or matter are continuous quantities, it follows
that however small the amount of space you divide, you can always divide it
again to reach a smaller amount. This process goes on to infinity, such that we
never arrive at a smallest point. If it is the case that there is no smallest point,
then no amount of points, however many, can satisfy a complete unit or whole. In
the Short Treatise, Spinoza states why the whole canʼt merely be the sum of its
parts: “If it did consist of parts, it would not be infinite through its nature…But it is
impossible that parts could be conceived in an infinite Nature, for all parts are, by
their nature, finite.”195 As Spinoza says in the first proposition of the Ethics,
“Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus,” in other words, the whole is prior
to its parts. Space as a whole, for example, is a single and uniform thing, and it is
only within space that we specify divisions.196 But it isnʼt the parts that construct
space, but the space that constructs the parts. Just as in the first proposition,
space is logically prior to a part of space. Without space, there are no parts of
space.
In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza provides a full chapter on Godʼs
simplicity. He gives a proof that God is not something composite, from which it
follows that he is simple:
Since it is clear through itself that component parts are prior in
nature at least to the thing composed, those substances by whose
coalition and union God is composed will necessarily be prior in
nature to God himself, and each one will be able to be conceived
through itself, although it is not attributed to God. Then, since they
must be really distinguished from one another, each one will also
necessarily be able to exist through itself without the aid of the
others; and so, as we have just said, there could be as many gods
as there are substances from which God would be supposed to be
composed. For since each one is able to exist through itself, it will
have to exist of itself, and therefore will also have the power of
giving itself all the perfections which we have shown to be in
God…But since nothing more absurd than this can be said, we
conclude that God is not composed of a coalition and union of
substances.197
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It might be objected that Spinoza is making contradictory statements when he
says that God is infinite and that God is simple. This objection is the same issue
the medieval philosophers faced who asserted that God is absolutely infinite and
absolutely simply. According to Wolfson, what was meant by simplicity is
threefold: the denial of the existence in God of accidental qualities, the denial of
essential attributes, i.e., the metaphysical or logical distinction of genus and
species in the divine nature, and the denial of the distinction of essence and
existence in the divine nature.198 Whether Spinozaʼs conception is the same as
this medieval view of simplicity cannot be said for sure, but Spinoza makes
strikingly similar statements. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says that “God is not
a species of any genus,”199 i.e., in God there is no distinction of genus and
species. This passage not only echoes Maimonides,200 but, as Edwin Curley also
notes, it echoes Aquinas.201 We know that Spinoza also agrees that there is no
distinction of essence and existence in the divine nature. Wolfson points to the
second scholium of Proposition VIII to show that Spinoza also agrees that
accidental qualities inhere in substance.202 Almost in the words of Maimonides,
Spinoza says that those who attribute accidental qualities to substance do so
“because they do not distinguish between the modifications of substances and
the substances themselves.”203 Spinoza does hold that God is infinite and simple,
but it is clear that Spinoza agrees with a medieval thesis that God is simple in the
sense that he is not an aggregate of parts, nor is he composed of an inner
plurality in his essence.204
His proof of Proposition XII in the Ethics is similar to his statement in the
Cogitata Metaphysica. He argues that if it were the case that a substance could
be divided, the parts into which it would be divided would either retain the nature
of the substance or would not. If the parts retain the nature of substance, then it
follows from Proposition VIII that each part is infinite, and also from Proposition
VII that each part is also its own cause. Further, by Proposition V each part has
to consist of a different attribute, for two or more substances canʼt share an
attribute. From all this it follows that many substances are formed from the
division of one substance, which has already been shown to be an absurdity by
Proposition VI, namely that one substance canʼt be produced by another
substance. Also, it has been shown in Proposition II that two substances having
different attributes have nothing in common with one another. This means that
the parts would have nothing in common with their whole, and by Definition IV
and Proposition X, it follows that the whole could be and be conceived without its
parts, quod absurdum esse nemo dubitare poterit.205
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Now that Spinoza has demonstrated that the parts canʼt retain the nature of
the whole [substance], he moves to the second possibility if substance could be
divided, namely that the parts will not retain the nature of substance. If this is
asserted, he says, “then since the whole substance would be divided into equal
parts,206 it would lose the nature of substance, and would cease to be.”207 This is
absurd by Proposition VII, for it pertains to the nature of substance to exist.
Whereas in Proposition XII where Spinoza establishes that no attribute can be
conceived from which it follows that the substance can be divided, Proposition
XIII attempts to establish that an absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. His
proof is similar to the previous proposition. He argues that if an absolutely infinite
substance were divisible, the parts would either retain the nature of the
absolutely infinite substance or they would not. If it were the case that they
retained the nature of the absolutely infinite substance, then there would be more
than one substance of the same nature, which is absurd by Proposition V. If they
do not retain its nature, then an absolutely infinite substance would not exist. But
it has already been shown that an absolutely infinite substance, namely God,
does exist by Proposition XI. Therefore, God is indivisible.
The corollary he provides tells us that it follows from these propositions that
no substance, nor attribute of a substance, i.e. the corporeal conception of
substance, is divisible. While we can conceive of matter as divisible in certain
respects, “insofar as it is a substance,”208 that is, as an attribute of substance, it
is not divisible. The nature of substance canʼt be conceived except as infinite.
Thus, “by a part of substance nothing can be understood except a finite
substance,”209 which is a contradiction since it has already been shown that
substance is necessarily infinite by Proposition VIII.

XIX. The Conceptual Priority of God
Spinoza now sets out to clarify the ontological status of God as a substance. He
says: “Except God, no substance can be or be conceived.”210 God is not only the
only substance that exists, but is also the only substance that can be conceived.
From Proposition V it has been shown that in nature there cannot be two or more
substances of the same nature or attribute, and from Proposition XI that God, a
substance with infinite attributes, necessarily exists. Since God has infinite, or all
possible, attributes, his existence makes it impossible for any other substance to
206
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exist, for if another substance existed, it would have to share an attribute with
God, which is a violation of Proposition V. This is Spinozaʼs full argument for
monism, the view that there is only one substance that exists, or can exist. His
argument can be formulated as follows:
1) God, a substance with every possible attribute, must necessarily exist.
(Proposition XI)
2) There cannot exist two substances that share an attribute. (Proposition V)
3) Therefore, there is only one substance, namely God. (Proposition XIV)
It follows from this that God is unique, as we have previously explained. And here
Spinoza declares that Godʼs uniqueness follows from the fact that “in Nature
there is only one substance, and that it is absolutely infinite.”211 In the second
corollary, Spinoza says that it also follows “that an extended thing and a thinking
thing are either attributes of God, or212 affections of Godʼs attributes.”213 This
statement isnʼt as clear as what Spinoza will say in the first two propositions of
Part Two of the Ethics, that “Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking
thing,”214 and “Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.”215
Spinoza includes a description of our understanding of Godʼs attributes in the
Short Treatise:
After the preceding reflections on Nature we have not yet been able
to find in it more than two attributes that belong to this all-perfect
being. And these give us nothing by which we can satisfy ourselves
that these would be the only ones of which this perfect being would
consist. On the contrary, we find in ourselves something which
openly indicates to us not only that there are more, but also that
there are infinite perfect attributes which must pertain to this being
before it can be called perfect. And where does this Idea of
perfection come from? It cannot come from these two, for two gives
only two, not infinitely many. From where, then? Certainly not from
me, for then I would have had to be able to five what I did not have.
From where else, then, than from the infinite attributes themselves,
which tell us that they are, though they so far do not tell us what
they are. For only of two do we know what they are.216
Our idea of God is explained by Spinoza as clear, because man “understands his
ʻattributes,ʼ which he could not produce because he is imperfect.”217
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In the Short Treatise, Spinoza lists three reasons why he holds that all the
attributes in Nature are only one, single being:
1. Because we have already found previously that there must be an
infinite and perfect being, by which nothing else can be understood
but a being of which all in all must be predicated. For of a being
which has some essence, [some] attributes must be predicated,
and the more essence one ascribes to it, the more attributes one
must also ascribe to it. So if a being is infinite, its attributes must
also be infinite, and that is precisely what we call a perfect being.
2. Because of the unity which we see everywhere in Nature; if there
were different beings in Nature, the one could not possibly unite
with the other.
3. Because, as we have already seen, one substance cannot
produce another, and if a substance does not exist, it is impossible
for it to begin to exist. We seem however, that in no substance
(which we nonetheless know to exist in Nature) is there, so long as
it is conceived separately, any necessity of existing. Since no
existence pertains to its particular essence, it must necessarily
follow that Nature, which comes from no cause, and which we
nevertheless know to exist, must necessarily be a perfect being,
existence belongs.218
Yet although extension and thought are attributes of God, they “do not exhaust
Godʼs nature,” for “The Absolute is more than Thought and Extension, though our
intelligence apprehends only them.”219

XX. The Impossibility of a Vacuum and the Infinity of Extension
Spinoza states in Proposition XV that “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be
or be conceived without God.”220 Since it is the case that except for God, no
substance can be, or be conceived (by Proposition XIV), and also that modes
cannot be conceived without substance (by Definition V), it follows that all
existent modes can only be, or be conceived, in the divine nature. And since it is
the case that except for substances and modes there is nothing (by Axiom I),
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everything is in God and nothing can be conceived without God.221 This means
that everything, not excluding matter, is in God.222
Spinoza now turns to an important concern that had also troubled him in his
early writings. This concern is the rejection of extension as an attribute of God.
According to Spinoza, “everyone who has to any extent contemplated the divine
nature denies that God is corporeal.”223 This reflects the complete medieval
denial of God as a material cause. Spinoza says that this denial arises from their
defining body as “any quantity, with length, breadth, and depth, limited by some
certain figure.”224 If this is in fact what body is, then it would be an absurdity to
say that an absolutely infinite being, God, has such a limited nature. It does not
seem possible to maintain that extension is an attribute of God, “for since
extension is divisible, the perfect being would consist of parts.”225
Spinoza presents a refutation of this denial of extension as an attribute of
God, showing that extension isnʼt necessarily divisible and composed of parts.
Just as he had previously done in his demonstration of Propositions XII and XIII,
Spinoza distinguishes between extension as an attribute and a mode, the former
being simple and the latter being divisible. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza gives a
detailed account of this distinction:
Concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that
division never occurs in the substance, but always and only in the
modes of substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the
mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance is
always the same, [though] now [it is the substance] of water, now
[the substance] of something else. Division, then, or being acted on,
always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes,
or is destroyed, that is only understood of the man insofar as he is a
composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance
itself on which he depends.226
Spinoza argues that if extension is not an attribute of God, that is, if extension is
not contained within the divine nature, then God would have had to create it as a
substance distinct from himself, which is absurd, for “if things have nothing in
common with one another, one of them cannot be the cause of the other,”227 and
“a substance cannot be produced by anything else.”228 Thus, Spinoza says: “By
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what divine power could it be created? They are completely ignorant of that. And
this shows clearly that they do not understand what they themselves say.”229
The first argument that Spinoza attributes to his opponents deals with is the
claim that since matter consists of parts, it cannot be infinite and thus cannot
pertain to God. They argue, for example, that if matter is infinite, and we divide it
in two parts, each part will either be finite or infinite. If they are said to be finite,
then two finite parts compose an infinite, which is absurd. If they are said to be
infinite, then there is one infinite twice as large as another, which is also absurd,
for one infinite canʼt be greater than another infinite. They also argue that if an
infinite quantity is measured by parts that are each equal to a foot, then it will
consist of infinitely many parts each equal to a foot. If it is measured by parts that
are each equal to an inch, then it will consist of infinitely many parts each equal
to an inch. Therefore, one infinite number is twelve times the size as the other,
which is absurd. From these three arguments, they conclude that matter is finite,
and cannot belong to Godʼs essence.
The second argument of Spinozaʼs opponent states that since God is a
supremely perfect being, he canʼt be acted upon. Matter, however, is divisible,
and thus can be acted upon. From this, it follows that matter cannot belong to
Godʼs essence. It is likely Descartes that is the voice of Spinozaʼs opponent here,
for he says in the Principles:
There are many things such that, although we recognize some
perfection in them, we also find in them some imperfection or
limitation, and these therefore cannot belong to God. For example,
the nature of body includes divisibility along with extension in
space, and since being divisible is an imperfection, it is certain that
God is not a body.230
According to Descartes, being divisible into parts is a way of being acted upon.
Thus, if all matter is divisible, it is passive, and cannot belong to Godʼs essence.
To refute these arguments, Spinoza begins by stating that the absurdities
from which his opponents infer that extended substance, or matter, is finite follow
“from the fact that they suppose an infinite quantity to be measurable and
composed of finite parts.”231 Rather than showing that corporeal substance is
finite, their arguments only show that infinite quantity is not measurable, and that
it is not composed of parts. Since Spinoza holds that infinite quantity is neither
measurable nor composed of parts, “so the weapon they aim at us, they really
turn against themselves.”232 Spinoza asks: “If corporeal substance could be so
divided that its parts were really distinct, why, then, could one part not be
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annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before?”233 If one
part can be annihilated, then it would either leave a vacuum or the other parts
would have to fill its place.
To understand how Spinoza formulates his response, we must look to what
Descartes says about a vacuum. Descartes had argued that there is no real
difference between space and corporeal substance [extension]. To recognize that
there is no difference between them, he asks us to attend to the idea of some
body, i.e. a stone, and remove all that is non-essential to the nature of body from
it. Hardness must be excluded, “since if the stone is melted or pulverized it will
lose its hardness without thereby ceasing to be a body.”234 Color is excluded,
“since we have often seen stones so transparent as to lack color.”235 Heaviness
is also excluded, “since although fire is extremely light it is still thought of as
being corporeal.”236 Lastly, cold and heat and all other such qualities are
excluded, “either because they are not thought of as being in the stone, or
because if they change, the stone is not on that account reckoned to have lost its
bodily nature.”237 With all of these non-essential qualities removed, Descartes
concludes that there is nothing left in our idea of the stone except that it is
something extended in length, breadth, and depth. And this idea is what
comprises the idea of space.238
Spinoza is clearly following Descartes, as he produces a similar argument for
the proposition that “the nature of body, or matter, consists in extension alone.”239
Spinoza justifies this claim by the fact that “the nature of the body is not taken
away when the sensible qualities are taken away,”240 that is, “even though the
hardness, weight, and rest of the sensible qualities are separated from a body,
the nature of the body will still remain whole,”241 as Descartes explains above. It
follows from this proposition, says Spinoza, that “space and body do not really
differ,”242 because space and extension do not really differ.
What follows from this is Spinozaʼs rejection of a vacuum, which is the basis
for his argument that matter is not divisible into distinct parts. In the Ethics, he
says that “there is no vacuum in nature (a subject I discuss elsewhere),”243 which
must refer to what he says in his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, as he does
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not mention the topic again in the Ethics.244 Spinoza is certainly referring to what
he says of the proposition that “it involves a contradiction that there should be a
vacuum.”245 Since the definition of a vacuum is “extension without corporeal
substance,”246 it follows from what has already been said that this means body
without body, which is absurd. That is, bodies between which nothing lies must
touch one another. Spinoza holds it as an axiom that “nothing has no properties,”
or, as Descartes says, “nothingness possesses no attributes or qualities.”247
Spinoza references a fuller explanation of this in Descartesʼ Principles.248 The
inclination to suppose that a vacuum can exist is formed by a prejudice we have
formed. Descartes tells us that when we ordinarily use the term empty, we are
not referring to a place or space in which there is absolutely nothing, but to a
place in which there is none of the things that we think ought to be there. For
example, we say that a pitcher that we use to hold water is empty when it is full of
air, or when a fishpond is full of water, we still call it empty if it has no fish in it.
However, we call space empty if it contains nothing perceivable by the senses,
although it is full of self-subsistent matter. We fall into error because normally the
only things we attend to in our thoughts are those which are detected by our
senses. Thus, when we are not attentive in our understanding of the terms
ʻemptyʼ and ʻnothing,ʼ says Descartes, “we may suppose that a space we call
empty contains not just nothing perceivable by the senses but nothing
whatsoever.”249 And this is just as fallacious as thinking that the air in a jug isnʼt a
subsistent thing because we usually think of it as empty when it contains nothing
but air. Descartes says:
When there is nothing between two bodies they must necessarily
touch each other. And it is a manifest contradiction for them to be
apart, or to have a distance between them, when the distance in
question is nothing; for every distance is a mode of extension, and
therefore cannot exist without an extended substance.250
Jonathan Bennett clarifies what underlies the reasoning of Spinoza and
Descartes:
If we pump all the air out of a jar, what is left in it? There cannot be
literally nothing left, for if there were nothing between the two sides
they would be contiguous. We might try to get out of allowing that
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there is something in the jar by saying that there is a distance
between its sides. But Descartes has a good reply to this. Distance,
he says, is a mode—a property or quality or measure—and there
must be something it is of: you can have a mile of road, or a yard of
fabric, but you cannot have a sheer mile or a naked yard. The moral
is that the jar must still contain something extended: it may lack
mass, solidity, impenetrability, etc., but it must be something with
size and shape—not a nothing with size and shape, a case of size
and shape which arenʼt of anything.251

XXI. Psychological Explanation of Dividing Quantity
Spinoza now turns to a psychological explanation of the human inclination to
divide quantity. He distinguishes between conceiving through the imagination and
conceiving through the intellect. The conception we have of quantity as it is in the
imagination is finite, divisible, and composed of parts, while the conception we
have of quantity as it is in the intellect is infinite, unique, and indivisible. Spinoza
says that this is sufficiently plain to everyone who knows how to distinguish
between the intellect and the imagination.252
Descartes provides an example in the Third Meditation of such a distinction:
There are two different ideas of the sun which I find within me. One
of them, which is acquired as it were from the senses and which is
a prime example of an idea which I reckon to come from an
external source, makes the sun appear very small. The other idea
is based on astronomical reasoning, that is, it is derived from
certain notions which are innate in me (or else it is constructed by
me in some other way), and this idea shows the sun to be several
times larger than the earth. Obviously both these ideas cannot
resemble the sun which exists outside me; and reason persuades
me that the idea which seems to have emanated most directly from
the sun itself has in fact no resemblance to it at all.253
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Spinoza inherits a deep criticism of the imagination from Descartes, who
describes it as “the deceptive judgment” that “botches things together.”254 Thus,
Spinoza later tells us that an imagining (imaginatio) “is an idea by which the Mind
considers a thing as present, which nevertheless indicates the constitution of the
human Body more than the nature of the external thing.”255
While the senses tell us that we can separate the physical world into distinct
objects, i.e., we can chop things in half and we can grind things into powder, the
whole of extension is a single whole. This is why Spinoza says that it follows from
the distinction of the imagination and the intellect that “matter is everywhere the
same” and “parts are distinguished in it only insofar as we conceive matter to be
affected in different ways, so that its parts are only distinguished modally, but not
really.”256
This distinction isnʼt thoroughly explained in the Ethics, and is derived again
from Descartes.257 Consider what Spinoza says in the Cogitata Metaphysica:
The modal distinction is shown to be twofold: there is that between
a mode of a substance and the substance itself, and that between
two modes of one and the same substance. We know the latter
from the fact that, although either mode may be conceived without
the aid of the other, nevertheless neither may be conceived without
the aid of the substance whose modes they are. The former is
known from the fact that, although the substance can be conceived
without its mode, nevertheless, the mode cannot be conceived
without the substance.258
The parts canʼt be distinguished really because they are not distinct things, since
they are both parts that are extended. As Descartes says, “strictly speaking, a
real distinction exists only between two or more substances.”259 For two things to
be really distinct, it must be the case that one can be understood without the aid
of the other.260 The distinction of parts of matter is modal, and Spinozaʼs example
in the Ethics clarifies this point. He says:
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We conceive that water is divided and its parts separated from one
another—insofar as it is water, but not insofar as it is corporeal
substance. For insofar as it is substance, it is neither separated nor
divided. Again, water, insofar as it is water, is generated and
corrupted, but insofar as it is substance, it is neither generated nor
corrupted.261
The distinction is between particular modes of matter or corporeal substance and
the general corporeal substance itself. The point of this example is that while it is
the case that we conceive water to be divided and its parts separated (via the
imagination), that is, particular instances of water are present at different times,
water itself considered as H2O does not come in or out of being, but its
components have always existed as modes of extension. Hence, Spinoza says in
a letter to Henry Oldenburg: “Men are not created, but only generated, and that
their bodies already existed before, though formed differently. It may, indeed, be
inferred, as I cheerfully acknowledge, that if one part of matter were annihilated,
the whole of Extension would also vanish at the same time.”262
His point is presented more clearly in the Short Treatise, where he says:
Concerning the parts in Nature, we say (as we said before) that
division never occurs in the substance, but always and only in the
modes of substance. So if I want to divide water, I divide only the
mode of the substance, not the substance itself; the substance is
always the same, [though] now [it is the substance] of water, now
[the substance] of something else. Division, then, or being acted on,
always happens in the mode, as when we say that a man perishes,
or is destroyed, that is only understood of the man insofar as he is a
composite being and mode of substance, and not the substance
itself on which he depends.263
To conclude, Spinoza has already refuted the first argument, that extension
cannot be infinite because matter is composed of parts, and an infinite cannot be
measured by parts. He did this by showing that his opponentsʼ arguments do not
show that corporeal substance is finite, but rather than an infinite quantity cannot
be measured and is not composed of parts. Our perceived distinction of the parts
is a modal distinction, and not a real distinction. There are no gaps in the attribute
of extension, since it has been shown that a vacuum is impossible. The second
argument, that extension cannot belong to Godʼs nature as a supremely perfect
being, since matter is divisible and thus passive, is also refuted first on the same
grounds that it is based on the supposition that matter is divisible into real parts
that are distinct. However, Spinoza says, this divisibility (if it existed) would not
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necessarily entail that extension is unworthy of the divine nature. He has already
shown by Proposition XIV that apart from God there can be no substance by
which the divine nature would be acted on. All things are in God, and all things
that happen, happen only through the laws of Godʼs infinite nature, following from
the necessity of his essence. Since this is the case, “it cannot be said in any way
that God is acted on by another, or that extended substance is unworthy of the
divine nature, even if it is supposed to be divisible, so long as it is granted to be
eternal and infinite.”264 God is unique and essentially active, and since extension
cannot be said to act upon God, it cannot be said to detract from the divine
nature or essence.

XXII. The Eight-fold Classification of God as Cause
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza devotes a chapter to the subject: How God is a
Cause of All Things. His classification of God as cause in the Ethics from
Propositions XVI-XVIII (and XXVIII, Schol.) correlates to his eight-fold
classification in the Short Treatise, which is presented as follows:

Ethics, I
Short Treatise, I, iii
Prop. XVI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Universal265 cause, general cause
Prop. XVI, Corol. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. Emanative, productive, active,
efficient cause
Prop. XVI, Corol. II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. Cause through himself (essential)
Prop. XVI, Corol. III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. First, initial cause
Prop. XVII, Corol. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. Principal cause
Prop. XVII, Corol. II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Free cause
Prop. XVIII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. Immanent cause
Prop. XXVIII, Schol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8. Proximate266 cause267
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As I have already noted, Wolfson has interpreted the first fifteen propositions of
Book I of the Ethics as a criticism of the immateriality of God, which culminates in
Proposition XVʼs statement that whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be
conceived without God, meaning that everything, including matter, is in God. He
interprets the remaining propositions of Book I as a criticism of the conceptions of
the causality of God.268 There is a bridge between these two issues by which the
assertion that God is immaterial by his nature, which was universally accepted in
medieval philosophy, led the medievals to deny that God was a material cause.
For example, in Maimonidesʼ discussion that God is the Primal Cause,269 he
states:
It has been shown in the science of physics that everything, except
the First Cause, owes its origin to the following four causes:—the
material, the formal, the efficient, and the final. These are
sometimes proximate, sometimes remote, but each by itself is
called a cause. They also believe—and I do not differ from their
belief—that God, blessed be He, is the efficient, the formal, and
final cause.270
Thus, since Maimonides rejects that the essence of God can be material, he
rejects that God can be a material cause, and asserts that God is the efficient,
formal, and final cause. On the other hand, since Spinoza asserts that the
attribute of extension is in Godʼs essence, he holds that God is the material
cause. Unlike Maimonides, Spinoza will end up removing the classification of
God as the final cause.271 For Spinoza, then, God is the efficient, formal, and
material cause. If we accept Wolfsonʼs interpretation of Spinozaʼs criticism, then
the second point of critique in Spinozaʼs first book of the Ethics is a direct result
of the first. That is, Spinoza holds that the medievals err in rejecting that
extension can belong to Godʼs nature, which culminates in Proposition XV and its
Scholium, and it is this false conception of Godʼs nature that gives rise to a false
conception of the causality of God in medieval philosophy.
In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza tells us that creation is “an activity in
which no causes concur except the efficient” and that a created thing is “that
which presupposes nothing except God in order to exist.”272 Maimonides had
previously identified the three causes in his statement: “Aristotle has already
explained that in Nature the efficient cause of a thing, its form, and its final cause
are identical.”273 Spinoza is making the same identification, but with the efficient,
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formal, and material cause, and not the final cause. Spinoza therefore holds that
the most applicable term for God is the efficient cause. Wolfson says this is so
because “even as a material and formal cause, it is only through the active
properties of extension and thought that God is conceived as cause” and God is
“efficient in the most general sense of active and as the sum of all conditions that
make for causality.”274
In the beginning of his chapter on Godʼs causality in the Short Treatise
Spinoza says that since one substance cannot produce another, and God is a
being of which all attributes are predicated, it follows “that all other things cannot
in any way exist or be understood without or outside him. So we have every
reason to say that God is a cause of all things.”275

XXIII. Universal Cause (1)
Spinoza first treats God as a universal or general cause. In Burgersdijck, the
efficient cause is divided into universal and particular. The “Universal is that
which concurrs with other Causes, with the Same Efficiency, to the producing of
many Effects,” and “a Particular only which by its Efficiency produces but one
Effect.”276 Similarly, Spinoza says of the universal cause in the Short Treatise:
“God is also a general [universal] cause, but only in the respect that he produces
different things. Otherwise, such a thing can never be said of him. For he does
not need anyone to produce effects.”277 I believe that Spinoza moved the order of
causes to place the universal cause first in order to show a further inconsistency
from the medieval denial of extension as an attribute of God that results in a false
conception of Godʼs causality. If God is pure simple form, and “a simple element
can only produce one simple thing,”278 then that which emanates from God can
only be one simple Intelligence and it must be the case that matter emerges
somewhere else later on in the emanative process. If this is the case, then
Wolfson is right that while God can be considered the indirect cause of ʻmany
effects,ʼ he is the direct cause of only one simple thing.279 Thus, according to the
classification above of universal and particular cause, this conception of God is
that of a particular cause and not a universal cause. Hence those who agree
with, for example, Aquinas, are mistaken when they say: “nothing can be among
beings, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is
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necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.”280 Spinozaʼs
God, on the other hand, is a universal cause, for he is the direct cause of
extended and thinking modes. Further, while medieval philosophers agreed that
God was infinite, they held that God did not, or ever will, create the infinite things
which he has in his mind. For Spinoza, this is clearly not the case. God produces
everything in the scope of his infinite intellect, and the world is thus as infinite as
God, consisting of an infinite number of modes. God is a universal cause
because the world is the full expression of his being.281 If the world were finite,
then Spinozaʼs God would be a particular cause. Thus, Spinoza tells us in
Proposition XVI: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow
infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall
under an infinite intellect.)”282

XXIV. Efficient Cause (2)
Efficient causation is the agency producing the result, or, as Burgersdijck says:
“An Efficient is an External Cause from which a thing proceeds by a true
Causality.” 283 In the Short Treatise, when Spinoza classifies God as an efficient
cause, he says that “God is an emanative or productive cause of his actions, and
in respect to the actionʼs occurring, an active or efficient cause. We treat this as
one thing, because they involve each other.”284 Whereas in Maimonides, the
modes follow from God by an efficient causation that specifically involves
emanation from the action of an immaterial being upon material objects,285 in
Spinoza this distinction of incorporeal and corporeal agency does not exist. Thus,
Spinoza concludes in the First Corollary of Proposition XVI that “God is the
efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite intellect.”286 As is said
in the Book of Psalms: “For with thee is the fountain of life: in thy light shall we
see light.”287
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XXV. Cause through himself (3)
God as an efficient cause is divided into cause per se288 and cause per
accidens.289 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza merely tells us that this will become
more evident in a later discussion. Turning to Burgersdijck, he defines a cause by
itself as “that which as it is such, produces an Effect of its own Council, and
agreeable to its Natural Disposition,” and a cause by accident as that “which not
as such, or else besides its own Council or Natural Propension.” 290 What this
means is that an essential cause, or cause by itself, is that which produces
something of its own kind. An accidental cause, on the other hand, is that which
produces something that is not of its own kind. Therefore, from the medieval
conception of God as immaterial and the world as material, that is, not of his own
kind, it follows that God is an accidental cause. However, since for Spinoza the
world is not of a different kind than God, he says in the Second Corollary of
Proposition XVI: “It follows…that God is a cause through himself and not an
accidental cause.”291

XXVI. First Cause (4)
In the Third, and last, Corollary to Proposition XVI in the Ethics, Spinoza says
that “it follows” that God is the absolute causam primam, that is, “absolutely the
first cause.”292 In the Short Treatise, the first cause is also called the “initiating
cause.”293 Spinoza again shows his minimalism by saying nothing else on the
topic. Jonathan Bennett is right when he says of Spinoza that “his minimalism
often leads him to underexpress his thought.”294 However, by looking into
Burgersdijckʼs logic, we can clarify exactly what Spinoza means. Burgersdijck
tells us that an efficient cause is divided into First and Second. “The First is that
which depends upon none” and “the Second, which depends upon the First.” 295
Further, there are two ways in which a cause is First: 1) absolutely, or 2) in its
own Genus.296 That which is absolutely the first cause is that “on which all things
depend; both when they are Made, Exist, and Operate…The Cause absolutely
First is only One, to wit, God. For all things depend on God, both as to their
Making, Being and Operating.”297 What Saint Paul says about our relation to God
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can be said for all beings: “for in him we live, and move, and have our being.”298
Yet, the proponents of the view that matter is not within Godʼs essence cannot
rightly say that God is the first cause. For if it is said that the material world was
created by God, but that God could not produce matter but only through his
subsequent emanations, it follows that God is dependent upon his emanations.299
And since this is the case, then the God that is not the material cause cannot be
a first cause, for the first is that which depends upon none, as Burgersdijck has
said. Therefore, it is Spinozaʼs God, and not the medievalsʼ God, who is an
absolutely first cause, for he produces everything, including matter, by the
necessity of his divine nature, depending on nothing else.

XXVII. Principal Cause (5)
In the Ethics, the next set of classifications of God as cause follows from his
demonstration of Proposition XVII: “God acts from the laws of his nature alone,
and is compelled by no one.”300 Since it is the case that from the necessity of the
divine nature alone, absolutely infinite things follow (Proposition XVI), and
nothing can be or be conceived without God (Proposition XV), there can be
nothing outside of God that determines him to action. It follows from this that God
acts from the laws of his nature alone, compelled by no one.301 The First
Corollary of Proposition XVII tells us that it follows from this demonstration that
“there is no cause, either extrinsically, or intrinsically, which prompts God to
action, except the perfection of his nature.”302 This parallels Spinozaʼs statement
in the Short Treatise that “God is a principal cause of the effects he has created
immediately, such as motion in matter, etc., where there can be no place for the
subsidiary cause, which is confined to particular things (as when God makes the
sea dry by a strong wind,303 and similarly in all particular things in Nature).304
Burgersdijck divided the efficient cause into the Principal and the less Principal.
He describes a Principal as “that which produces the Effect by its own Virtue”
and a Less Principal as that “which inserves the Principal towards its producing
the Effect.” 305 A Principal Cause is said to be either equal to or nobler than the
effect, but never more, whereas the less principal, insofar as it causes, is always
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inferior to the effect. Thus, Burgersdijck says: “When we compare the Effect with
the Cause we are to consider the Cause as it is such; that is, according to that
Virtue by which it causes, when the Virtue of the Cause is such as that it contains
in it, whatever is in the Effect, it is said to be a principal Cause.” 306 Since Godʼs
action flows from his own nature, and is compelled by no cause, extrinsically, or
intrinsically, it can be said that God is a principal cause.

XXVIII. Free Cause (6)
Spinozaʼs next classification of God as cause returns to his definitions of free and
necessary, from which he now classifies God as a free cause. Definition VII
states: “That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature
alone, and is determined to act by itself alone. But a thing is called necessary, or
rather compelled, which is determined by another to exist and to produce an
effect in a certain and determinate manner.”307 Wolfson has pointed out that the
problem of freedom in medieval philosophy is sometimes alternatively called the
problem of possibility.308 For example, the discussion of freedom in Crescas is
stated as: “An exposition of the view of him who believes that the nature of
possibility exists,” and, “An exposition of the view of him who believes that the
nature of possibility does not exist.”309 Wolfson links this same way of addressing
the problem in the Short Treatise, where Spinoza asks the question: “Whether
there are any contingent things in Nature, viz. whether there are any things that
can happen and also can not happen.”310 In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Spinoza
distinguishes between possibility and contingency. He says that “a thing is called
possible, then, when we understand its efficient cause, but do not know whether
the cause is determined. So we can regard it as possible, but neither as
necessary or as impossible.”311 On the other hand, “if…we attend to the essence
of the thing alone, and not to its cause, we shall call it contingent.”312 He clarifies
this by saying: “We shall consider it as midway between God and a chimaera, so
to speak, because we find in it, on the part of its essence, neither any necessity
of existing (as we do in the divine essence) nor any impossibility or inconsistency
(as we do in a chimaera).”313 A thing is possible, then, when it is made necessary
by a cause, and a thing is contingent when it is possible in consideration of its
own essence, that is, its essence does not necessitate its existence nor does it
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involve a contradiction.314 However, Spinoza does not think much about the
distinction between these two terms, and says of those who would equate the
two, that he “shall not contend with him…For I am not accustomed to dispute
about words. It will suffice if he grants us that these two are nothing but a defect
in our perception, and not anything real.”315 Thus, Wolfson is right when he says
that Spinoza wishes to eliminate the idea that anything in nature is possible per
se, for “everything which is possible per se is necessary in consideration of its
cause.” 316 The term possible per se is merely a logical distinction, which
represents no actual thing in nature. Hence, Spinoza says: “If he attends to
nature and how it depends on God, he will find that there is nothing contingent in
things, that is, nothing which, on the part of the thing, can either exist or not exist,
or as is commonly said, be a real contingent.”317 Since this is the case, there are
only two divisions of existing things: 1) that which is necessary by its cause, and
2) that which is necessary by its own nature. Spinozaʼs definition of freedom,
then, involves this distinction. Put simply, that which is necessary by its own
nature is free and that which is necessary by its cause is compelled, or merely
called necessary. This is why Spinoza says in the Short Treatise: “True freedom
is nothing but [being] the first cause, which is not in any way constrained or
necessitated by anything else, and only through its perfection is the cause of all
perfection.”318
According to Wolfson, there is a deeper criticism behind Spinozaʼs God as a
free cause than what I have already said.319 This lies in the medieval conception
of Godʼs causality as an act of will, power, or intelligence, typically used in
connection with creation, which is found in Saadia, Maimonides, and Judah haLevi. Maimonides holds that all three are identical in God.320 Maimonides admits
that God cannot do the logically impossible, i.e., “produce a square with a
diagonal equal to one of its sides, or a solid angle that includes four right
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angles.”321 Further, he says, “it is impossible that God should produce a being
like Himself, or annihilate, corporify, or change Himself,” and “the power of God is
not assumed to extend to any of these impossibilities.”322 Yet, when the question
is raised that “to say of God that He can produce a thing from nothing or reduce a
thing to nothing is…the same as if we were to say that He could…produce a
square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar impossibilities,”323
Maimonides answers the question of Creation by saying: “He willed it so; or His
wisdom decided so.”324 Maimonides holds that “He…produced from nothing all
existing things such as they are by His will and desire.”325
In the previous Corollary to Proposition XVII, Spinoza had said “there is no
cause, either extrinsically or intrinsically, which prompts God to action, except the
perfection of his nature.” Spinoza is attempting to remove the notion of will and
design from Godʼs causality, placing creation ex nihilo next to the other logical
impossibilities. Maimonides holds that God is “perfect, incorporeal…above all
kinds of deficiency.”326 Thus, God canʼt be said to have any kind of imperfection
in his nature, including deficiencies in his will or intellect. Hence, Spinoza
responds: “I know there are many who think they can demonstrate that a
supreme intellect and free will belong to Godʼs nature. For they say they know
nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than what is the highest perfection
in us.”327
There is, however, a deeper criticism in Spinozaʼs scholium to Proposition
XVII. Wolfson links Spinozaʼs criticism to the view held by Abraham Herrera, who
had said that God as the first cause acts not from the necessity of His nature but
by the counsel of His intellect and the choice of His free will. In the Kabbalah, the
question had been raised whether God could create the infinite number of things
in his intellect or whether his power of creation was limited to that which he has
created?328 In response to this, Herrera makes the following two remarks: “If God
had acted from His own nature and by necessity, He would have inevitably
produced everything that is in His power, which would be infinite,” and “since God
has created by will and design, He has purposely created only a part of that
which is in His intellect, in order to be able to create other and more perfect
things.”329 Herrera tells us that an infinite number of things have not been brought
into existence because God does not act by the necessity of his infinite nature.
Instead, it is because “He acts only by the freedom of His will and purpose…that
He has brought into existence and created finite things” and “for every one of the
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created things, however excellent it may be, He is able to produce something
more excellent.”330 Spinoza certainly appears to be directly attacking this view
when he says:
Moreover, even if they conceive God to actually understand in the
highest degree, they still do not believe that he can bring it about
that all the things he actually understands exist. For they think that
in that way they would destroy Godʼs power. If he had created all
the things in his intellect (they say), then he would have been able
to create nothing more, which they believe to be incompatible with
Godʼs omnipotence. So they preferred to maintain that God is
indifferent to all things, not creating anything except what he has
decreed to create by some absolute will…Therefore to maintain that
God is perfect, they are driven to maintain at the same time that he
cannot bring about everything to which his power extends. I do not
see what could be feigned which would be more absurd than this or
more contrary to Godʼs omnipotence.331
There is an explicit criticism of his opponents ascribing will and intellect to God as
homonymous terms. Again, we find in Maimonides that there is only a
resemblance between Godʼs knowledge and our knowledge in name, for his
“essence is in no way like our essence” and people are misled by this
homonymity because “only the words are the same, but the things designated by
them are different; and therefore they came to the absurd conclusion that that
which is required for our knowledge is also required for Godʼs knowledge.”332 Of
Godʼs will, Maimonides also says: “The term ʻwillʼ is homonymously used of
manʼs will and of the will of God, there being no comparison whatever between
Godʼs will and that of man.”333 Spinoza characterizes what follows from this
common view:
If intellect and will do pertain to the eternal essence of God,334 we
must of course understand by each of these attributes something
different from what men commonly understand. For the intellect and
will which would constitute Godʼs essence would have to differ
entirely from out intellect and will, and could not agree with them in
anything except in name. They would not agree with one another
any more than do the dog that is a heavenly constellation and the
dog that is a barking animal.335
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As Wolfson notes, Spinoza likely means to convey “that since intellect and will
are applied to God only homonymously, they are meaningless terms, and
consequently Godʼs activity might as well be described as following form the
necessity of His nature.”336 This is justified by Spinozaʼs statement on the same
topic in his letter to Hugo Boxel:
Since…it is commonly and unanimously admitted that Godʼs will is
eternal and has never been indifferent, and therefore they must
also necessarily grant (note this well) that the world is the
necessary effect of the divine nature. Let them call it will, intellect,
or any name they please, they will still in the end come to realise
that they are expressing one and the same thing by different
names. For if you ask them whether the divine will does not differ
from the human will, they will reply that the former has nothing in
common with the latter but the name; and furthermore they will
mostly admit that Godʼs will, intellect, and essence or nature are
one and the same thing.337
In the Moreh Nebukim, Maimonides places both chance and necessity in
opposition to creation as an act of Godʼs will. Those who follow Epicurus, says
Maimonides, “believe that the existing state of things is the result of accidental
combination and separation of the elements and that the Universe has no Ruler
or Governor.”338 Hence, chance denies the existence of any cause in creation, for
“there is none that rules or determines the order of the existing things.”339
Maimonides places necessity in opposition to creation as an act of Godʼs will
because he believes that God could have refrained from creating the world, or he
could have designed it differently. It is still a common religious belief today that
our existence is a gift of Godʼs will in a benevolent act of creation. However,
Spinoza attempts to differentiate between chance and necessity, and in doing so,
demonstrate that “if God is assumed to act by a will whose laws are unknown to
us, His activity really amounts to chance.”340 In the same epistle to Hugo Boxel,
Spinoza gives an account of his view on the question as to whether the world
was made by chance:
My answer is that, as it is certain that chance and necessity are two
contrary terms, so it is also clear that he who affirms that the world
is the necessary effect of the divine nature is also denying that the
world was made by chance, whereas he who affirms that God could
336
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have refrained from creating the world is declaring in an indirect
way that it was made by chance, since it proceeded from an act of
will which might not have been.341
It might be objected, though, that Spinoza is making an equivocation and
introducing some other definition of chance. However, the view that Spinoza is
attacking can be located. Wolfson outlines three views from the Middle Ages that
existed in regard to the relation of God to the world and Godʼs knowledge of the
world.342 The first view is strikingly similar to the position Spinoza is attacking in
the above passage, namely that God is the arbitrary creator of the world who,
having created it, is the arbitrary ruler of it. Both the creation and governance of
the world are considered as the exercise of two faculties in God, that is, his free
will and power. These faculties are conceived after the manner of free will and
power in man, though they are infinitely superior to those of man and absolutely
arbitrary, as God is independent of any external conditions or circumstances.
This view is described by Wolfson as “primarily the uncritical opinion of the
common masses of believers.”343 He notes that this was presented as a
philosophical system by a branch of the Moses Kalam, which is restated in
Maimonides.344
According to this view, Godʼs will and power are conceived as
absolute, unlimited, and unchecked by any rule. Creation, as a free
exercise of will and power, is furthermore a continuous act, and
every event is a direct creation of God. Existence is a succession of
specially created events. It is analogous to the theory of divine
concurrence alluded to elsewhere by Spinoza,345 though, I must
say, the two views are not necessarily identical, for the Kalam
denies not only natural causality but also uniformity of action in
nature, inasmuch as it assumes Godʼs will to be absolutely
arbitrary, whereas divine concurrence does not necessarily assume
Godʼs will to be absolutely arbitrary; it is rather an intelligent will;
and hence, barring the possibility of miracles, divine concurrence
does not deny uniformity of action in nature. Spinoza characterizes
ass such views as views which make everything dependent upon
chance, and deny natural causality altogether.346
It is only fitting that Wolfson refers to Spinozaʼs epistle to Hugo Boxel at the end
of this passage. In the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza also says: “By Godʼs
341
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power ordinary people understand Godʼs free will and his right over all things
which are, things which on that account are commonly considered to be
contingent.”347
Spinoza holds that the attribution of will to the essence of God is no different
than explaining things by chance, which likewise implies a denial of causality.
Hence, his statement: “Tell me, pray, whether you have seen or read any
philosophers who have maintained that the world was made by chance, taking
chance in the sense you give it, that God had a set aim in creating the world and
yet departed from his resolve.”348

XXIX. Immanent Cause (7)
In the Short Treatise, Spinozaʼs acceptance of the principle of sufficient reason
leads him to ask: “Whether there is any thing in Nature of which one cannot ask
why it exists?”349 Spinoza mentions that in asking this we are also indicating
through what cause a thing exists. Spinoza defines a cause as that which if it “did
not exist, it would be impossible for this something to exist.”350 Note that Spinoza
isnʼt imposing any arbitrary definition of a cause as his own. Consider Crescasʼ
definition of cause:
For by a cause is meant that the existence of which implies the
existence of an effect and should the cause be conceived not to
exist the effect could not be conceived to exist.351
Spinozaʼs third and fourth axioms certainly echo this.352 That being said, Spinoza
proceeds to discuss the nature of the cause:
We must seek this cause, then, either in the thing or outside it. But
if someone asks what rule we should follow in this investigation, we
say it does not seem that any at all is necessary. For if existence
belongs to the nature of the thing, then certainly we must not seek
the cause outside it. But if existence does not belong to the nature
of the thing, then we must always seek the cause outside it. And
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since the former is only true of God, this shows (as we have already
proven before) that God alone is the first cause of everything.353
Spinoza states in Proposition XVIII: “God is the immanent,354 not the transitive,355
cause of all things.”356 Burgersdijck divides the efficient cause into immanent and
transient cause. He describes the immanent as “that which produces the Effect in
its self,” 357 and the transient, “out of it self.” 358 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza
says that God “is an immanent and not a transitive cause, since he does
everything in himself, and not outside himself (because outside him there is
nothing).”359 This is precisely how Spinoza demonstrates that God is the
immanent cause of all things in the Ethics. For since it is the case that everything
that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God (by Proposition XV), God
must be the cause of all things which are in him (by Proposition XVI, Corol. I).
That is, God is the efficient cause of all things which can fall under an infinite
intellect. Further, there can be no substance, or thing in itself, which is outside
God (by Proposition XIV). It follows, says Spinoza, that God “is the immanent, not
the transitive cause of all things.”360
Since this is the only time Spinoza uses the term immanent in the Ethics, it is
necessary to look into Spinozaʼs other writings to give a thorough explanation of
what it means to be an immanent cause. In a late epistle to Henry Oldenburg,
Spinoza describes his conception of God as “far different from that which modern
Christians are wont to uphold. For I maintain that God is the immanent cause, as
the phrase is, of all things, and not the transitive cause.”361 He describes this
view as the affirmation that all things “are in God and move in God.”362 More
important is his reference in the Short Treatise to “an immanent or internal cause
(which is all one, according to me)”363 Note that transcendent is not the same as
transient, for Spinoza uses the term transcendens to mean logically greater or
more general. 364 Thus, it is not a contradiction to say that God is a transcendent
immanent cause. It is evident from all that has been said up to now that when
Spinoza denies that God is a transitive cause of all things, he is denying that God
is an external cause that is spatially separate from the world or that he is an
immaterial cause separate from the world. When Spinoza says that God is an
immanent cause, he is denying that God is an external and separable, hence
immaterial, cause from the world. As Spinoza says in the Short Treatise, “the
353
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effect of an internal cause remains united with its cause in such a way that it
makes a whole with it.”365
The meaning of Godʼs immanence, and his unity with all things, does not
mean that God is in things as the soul is traditionally conceived to be in the body,
but instead, as Wolfson interprets Spinoza, “all things are in God as the less
universal is in the more universal or, to use Spinozaʼs own expression, as the
parts are in the whole.”366 Although the universal does not exist separately from
the particulars, it is not identical with them either. Hence, Wolfson says of God:
“Being thus the immanent cause of all things in the sense that He is inseparable
from them but still logically distinct from them, God may also be said to transcend
them according to the old meaning of the term ʻtranscendence,ʼ namely, that of
being logically distinct and more general.”367

XXX. Proximate Cause (8)
In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says: “God is the proximate cause of those things
that are infinite and immutable, and which we say that he has created
immediately; but he is, in a sense, the remote cause of all particular things.”368
This corresponds to a passage in the Ethics, which is found in the Scholium of
Proposition XXVIII: “God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things
produced immediately by him, and not [a proximate cause] in his own kind, as
they say. For Godʼs effects can neither be nor be conceived without their
cause.”369 Spinoza says that this follows from Proposition XV. Burgersdijck had
divided the efficient cause into the proxima (next) and the remote. The next, says
Burgersdijck, “is that which produces the Effect immediately.” 370 The remote, on
the other hand, is that “which produces the Effect by means of some more
neighbouring Cause.”371 This is very obscure, and it is necessary to point out yet
another passage in Spinoza to understand what he means by a proximate cause.
In the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, Spinoza discusses the causal
relations between singular, changeable things, and the fixed and eternal things.
He points out that the essences of singular, changeable things are not derived
from their series, that is, their order of existing, because this order is composed
only of extrinsic denominations. This order is only circumstance, which tells us
nothing of the “inmost essence of things.” This essence is to be found only in the
fixed and eternal things, and the laws inscribed in them, which Spinoza calls their
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“true codes,” from which singular things derive their order and coming to be. He
continues:
Indeed these singular, changeable things depend so intimately, and
(so to speak) essentially, on the fixed things that they can neither
be nor be conceived without them. So although these fixed and
eternal things are singular, nevertheless, because of their presence
everywhere, and most extensive power, they will be to us like
universals, or genera of the definitions of singular, changeable
things, and the proximate causes of all things.372
Through a close reading of this passage, we can uncover what Spinoza means
by classifying God as a proximate cause. It is obvious that when Spinoza says
that the “singular, changeable things depend…essentially, on the fixed and
eternal things” he means that the modes cannot be nor be conceived without
God as the efficient cause, whose essence and existence are one and the same.
When he says that the fixed and eternal things are the “genera of the definitions
of singular, changeable things, and the proximate cause of all things” because of
their “presence everywhere” and “extensive power,” he means that substance
under one of its infinite attributes provides the first cause and universal genus for
all finite things. The definition of a finite thing, then, gives us the proximate cause,
which is the first cause as modified in a certain way in one of the attributes of
substance. In the demonstration of Proposition XVI, Spinoza refers to an attribute
of substance as a kind of genus: “Since the divine nature has absolutely infinite
attributes, each of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind
[genus], from its necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinite
modes.”373 Wolfson makes a controversial claim that substance has the
character of a summum genus, and concludes that “Spinozaʼs substance is
inconceivable, and its essence indefinable and hence unknowable.”374 This view
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is clearly false, for Spinoza states in Proposition XLVII of the second part of the
Ethics that we can have knowledge of Godʼs essence: “The human mind has an
adequate knowledge of Godʼs eternal and infinite essence.”375 John Carriero
criticizes Wolfson, and states that “what has the character of summa genera in
Spinozaʼs metaphysics are the attributes of substance, and while it follows that
attributes are undefinable (because they are not conceived through anything
else), he does not regard them as unknowable.”376 This view is much more
plausible, and fits in with Spinozaʼs reference to the attributes as infinite in their
own genus.
God is absolutely the proximate cause of things which are produced
immediately by him, that is, the infinite modes that are the totality of modes within
a certain attribute. These are infinite and immutable, unlike finite modes. It is only
as a first cause that God is a proximate cause, for God depends on none, and
embraces all possible genera, that is, his attributes. The unchanging laws cannot
be conceived without their cause, which is God, and the finite modes which
depend on these laws cannot be conceived without them. God is the proximate
cause by immediately being the cause of these laws, or infinite and eternal
modes. In a very loose sense, God is also a remote cause. For the effects of the
infinite and eternal modes are finite modes, and hence God causes the finite
modes through the “neighbouring cause” of the infinite modes. However, since
everything is in God, he is not separate from his effects. What Spinoza means by
infinite and finite modes will be explained in the section below on modes.

XXXI. Duration and Time
Spinoza describes duration as “an attribute under which we conceive the
existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality.”377
Similarly, Descartes says: “We should regard the duration of a thing simply as a
mode under which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist.”378
There are, however, three differences between Descartesʼ and Spinozaʼs
definitions: 1) Descartes calls duration a mode, and Spinoza calls it an attribute.
2) Descartes only says in so far as it perseveres to exist, whereas Spinoza uses
first the term existence like Descartes, but then adds the term actuality in the
which is the universe—(not necessarily excluding its being immanent, too). And yet, contrariwise,
Spinoza maintained, differing from both Descartes and Maimonides, that ʻthe human mind
possesses an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of Godʼ (II, 47). Besides, it
would be somewhat difficult, were Wolfson correct, to explain why ʻthe highest good of the mind is
the knowledge of God and the highest virtue of the mind is to know Godʼ (IV, 28). The inspiration
of the amor Dei intellectualis would, on the same principle, be pure charlatanism.”
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statement insofar as they persevere in their actuality. 3) Descartes simply says
thing, whereas Spinoza speaks of created things.
Wolfson argues that Spinozaʼs move to holding that duration is an attribute,
rather than a mode, was at the suggestion of Descartes himself, even though in
Descartesʼ formal definition, he refers to duration as a mode. Descartes says:
“And even in the case of created things, that which always remains unmodified—
for example existence or duration in a thing which exists and endures—should be
called not a quality or mode but an attribute.”379 Spinoza uses the term attribute
here in a loose sense of thinking in a general way of what is in a substance.
There is great importance in the term existence used here. Spinozaʼs addition
of the term actuality in his explanation of existence emphasizes that it is
existence rather than motion that is required for the conception of duration.
Again, Descartes says: “For the duration which we understand to be involved in
movement is certainly no different from the duration involved in things which do
not move.”380 It also emphasizes that there is no duration in beings which have
no existence (fictitious beings, beings of reason). To be clear in his statement,
when Spinoza adds existence “insofar as they persevere in their actuality,” this
means that existence must be an actual existence and not one which is only in
thought.
Spinoza again pushes this idea that duration requires an actually existent
object when he says that: “Duration is an affection of existence, not of the
essence of things.”381 By essence, Spinoza is referring to the concept of a thing
which may or may not have existence outside of our mind, i.e., chimeras. Later,
when Spinoza discusses creation, the point that duration depends upon actually
existent things is expressed more clearly: “We can imagine neither time nor
duration before creation, but these latter have begun with things…Wherefore,
duration presupposes, or at least, supposes created things.”382 As Spinoza
clearly points out, his usage of the term creation is not the traditional coming into
being out of nothing that we are still so familiar with. Spinozaʼs idea of the
existence of created things only means that things conceived as having duration
must have their existence dependent upon a cause, and whether they had a
beginning in time or not makes no difference. Spinoza has already said that
duration is to be attributed to things only in so far as their “essence is conceived
clearly without any existence.”383
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Wolfson raises the question whether existence and duration are identical. He
points out that the scholastics held three different positions in answering this
question: 1) duration and existence differ from each other in re and realiter,
meaning that they are separable and each can be conceived without the other. 2)
the difference between them is a modal difference, like that which exists between
a substance and a mode or between two modes (Bonaventure, Bañez, and other
Thomists), 3) duration and existence are inseparable though distinct, with the
distinction being one of reason (Ockham, Scotus, Biel, Suarez). Descartes also
describes these three distinctions in his Principles of Philosophy.384 Spinoza
clearly accepts the third position. Descartesʼ definition of a conceptual distinction
(a distinction of reason) is: “a distinction between a substance and some attribute
of that substance without which the substance is unintelligible.”385 Descartes
goes on to say that: “since a substance cannot cease to endure without also
ceasing to be, the distinction between a substance and its duration is merely a
conceptual one.”386 Spinozaʼs reasoning seems to strikingly similar, when he
says: “It clearly follows that duration is only distinguished by reason from the
whole existence of a thing. For as you take duration away from the thing, you
take away just as much of its existence.”387
Next Spinoza says that we can take the duration of a thing, “but to determine
this duration, we compare it to the duration of other things which have a certain
and determinate motion. This comparison is called time.”388 Spinoza gives a
similar definition of time in the Ethics: “Nobody doubts that time, too, is a product
of the imagination, and arises from the fact that we see some bodies move more
slowly than others, or more quickly, or with equal speed.”389 This is again found in
Descartes, where in the Principles he states: “But in order to measure the
duration of all things, we compare their duration with the duration of the greatest
and most regular motions which give rise to years and days, and we call this
duration ʻtime.ʼ”390 Spinoza thus ends up drawing the same conclusion as
Descartes, that time adds nothing to duration, but is a being of reason: “Yet
nothing is thereby added to duration, taken in its general sense, except for a
mode of thought,”391 and “Time, therefore, is not an affection of things, but only a
mere mode of thinking, or, as we have already said, a being of reason. For it is a
mode of thinking that serves to explain duration.”392 Duration is a mode of
existence, and time is a mode of duration.
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The same account of time that is found in the Cogitata Metaphysica is also
found in Epistle XII, though Spinoza uses the term modes as equivalent to
created things. These terms refer to those things whose essence does not
necessarily involve existence.393 He thus describes duration as that by means of
which we can only explain the existence of modes. From the fact that we can
ʻdetermineʼ duration, time arises for the purpose of doing so. To Spinoza, time is
merely a mode of thinking, but it is specifically a mode of imagining.394 The point
of these statements is to emphasize that time is not something in the things
outside of us, but it is only existent in the imagination, which is not a real
existence.
To sum up Spinozaʼs account of duration, there are two characteristics he
gives it:
1) The existence of an object conceived under the attribute of duration must
be only a possible existence, which depends on God as an efficient
cause.395 This differentiates duration from eternity.
2) Duration is to be conceived as unlimited, unmeasured, and undetermined.
This differentiates duration from time.
As a final point on duration, he defines it as the “indefinite continuance of
existing.”396 His description of duration as indefinite fits perfectly with the twofold
characteristics of duration outlined above.
Next, to sum up his account of time, we note that it has no essential
difference from duration, though it is merely a limited portion of duration. We saw
that Spinoza speaks of duration as indefinite time, whereas he will later contrast
this with definite time.397 He also refers to time as “determinable duration”398 and
thus he sometimes says “duration or time”399 as if the two terms mean the same
to Spinoza.

XXXII. Eternity
Moving on to the definition of eternity, it should be noted that the notion of
eternity had a special role throughout the entire medieval period, as God was
always considered under some aspect of eternity.400 The duality of meanings for
393

This point will be emphasized in Spinozaʼs description of eternity.
Hobbes had said that time is a phantasm of motion.
395
Created things in Epistle XII, modes in CM.
396
Ethics, II, Def. V. C I.447.
397
Ethics, III, Proposition VIII. C I.499.
398
Ethics, I, Proposition XXI, Dem. C I.430.
399
Ethics, I, Def. VIII. C I.409.
400
Wolfson argues that there arose a division of the definition of eternity in the time of Plato. This
was due, he argues, to the distinction that Plato made between the world of ideas (which is
394

75
eternity are simply: 1) exclusion of time, and 2) infinite time. In the medieval
Jewish philosophy that Spinoza was brought up under, the passage in the book
of Isaiah 44:6 was of specific importance in relation to Godʼs eternity, and was a
popular passage for interpretation. This passage reads that God is the first and
the last. Maimonides said that this is simply a negation of Godʼs having been
created, and Crescas follows him in this.401 Judah ha-Levi said that this is a
negation of Godʼs having been preceded by anything (first), and of His ever
coming to an end (last). Similarly, this has a specific relation to the idea of
eternity being identified with immovability and immutability. God was immovable,
is immovable, and will be immutable. Joseph Albo said that these terms simply
mean that God has absolute independence of any temporal relations, and
eternity as applies to God excludes duration (and time). Spinoza was familiar with
all of these views, and it is noticeable that he placed specific attention on Alboʼs
conclusion that God alone has necessary existence by his own nature, as
compared with all other things, which have only possible existence.
The conclusion reached by Albo is of importance to us because this simply
means that in God his essence and his existence are identical, which is
Spinozaʼs basis for Godʼs existence.402 From this basis, Albo then says that
eternity is to be defined as identity, uniformity, and immutability. So a notion of
eternity in this sense must involve necessary existence, but what else? Eternity is
a permanence (the ever-fixed) while time is a constant change or motion (the
never-fixed). Thus, time, even if conceived as an infinite time is of a different
meaning than eternity, since even an infinite time is not a permanence. We can
conclude from this that for Spinoza eternity can not simply be taken to mean an
endless time. Eternity is what differentiates God (the whole) from other beings
(the parts). Spinoza expresses this view in his explanation of the definition of
eternity403 when he says that eternity canʼt be explained by duration and time,
even if they are conceived without beginning or end. This marks the erroneous
usage of the term eternity, as it is still used today when describing the ʻeternity of
the worldʼ as meaning eternal duration in time. In the Cogitata Metaphysica,404
Spinoza describes two defective uses of the term eternity:
1) When we say that the world has existed from eternity.
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2) When we say things which do not exist are eternal, i.e. the pure essence
of a thing.
What Spinoza means by the second defective use is that when Descartes refers
to axioms as eternal truths,405 this is not sufficient to be eternal in the same
sense that God is. For, while eternal truths may be unchanging, which satisfies
one aspect of eternity, they are not existence which necessarily follows from its
own nature, essence involving existence. Eternity is only applicable to what
Spinoza calls “real beings”, and only to the first being, who is causeless and
infinite as undetermined. It is no surprise that later, when Spinoza outlines the
three kinds of knowledge, or ways in which the existence of a thing may be
known: 1) the way of perception, 2) the way of reason, 3) the way of intuition; it is
only the latter kind of knowledge that is able to arrive at the existence of God as
the only true eternal being. Spinoza thus says in Proposition XIX: “God is eternal,
or all of Godʼs attributes are eternal.”406 Since Godʼs essence and existence are
one and the same, Godʼs attributes are immutable.407

XXXIII. Modes
The next step in Spinozaʼs metaphysics is to explain how the modes follow from
substance.408 I will begin with the preliminary question: why must substance
produce modes at all? Spinoza gives a thorough answer to this in Proposition
XVI, which we have already discussed in the section on God as the universal
cause. In this proposition, Spinoza tells us that from the necessity of the divine
nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes. Spinoza
holds it to be evident that the greater something is, or, the more essence
something has, the greater the number of properties which follow from its
essence. Only a finite number of properties can follow from a finite essence.
Since Godʼs essence is the greatest, the greatest number of properties must
necessarily follow from his essence. This is why Spinoza says that infinitely many
modes follow from Godʼs essence, since his essence is infinite. His argument is
given as follows:
This Proposition must be plain to anyone, provided he attends to
the fact that the intellect infers from the given definition of any thing
a number of properties that really do follow necessarily from it (i.e.,
from the very essence of the thing); and that it infers more
405
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properties the more the definition of the thing expresses reality, i.e.,
the more reality the essence of the defined thing involves. But since
the divine nature has absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. VI), each
of which also expresses an essence infinite in its own kind, from its
necessity there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many
modes (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect),
q.e.d.409
Spinoza endorses a principle of ontological plenitude,410 according to which the
maximal number of compossible objects actually exists.411 I think Samuel
Newlands is absolutely correct when he says that Spinozaʼs motivation for the
principle of ontological plenitude derives from the principle of sufficient reason
itself, “since if the actual world were sub-maximal, non-existing but intrinsically
possible, objects would have no reason for not existing, a brute fact.”412 It simply
follows from the principle of sufficient reason that if there is any “ontological
space to be filled, it must be filled.”413 The medieval appeals to the will of God414
arenʼt a sufficient explanation, for “it canʼt simply be that God decided, ab initio415
and without further explanation, to make a less than full world.”416 Spinozaʼs
world is the best of all possible worlds, not merely because it is the only possible
world, but because it is a world that lacks nothing, since it encompasses the
fullness of Being.

XXXIV. Immediate Infinite Modes
For Spinoza, the modes have different relations to substance. The modes which
follow directly from substance are the immediate infinite modes,417 and the
modes which follow directly from the immediate infinite modes are the mediate
infinite modes.418 The finite modes, on the other hand, do not follow directly from
substance. The infinite immediate modes are those “fixed and eternal things,”
following directly from Godʼs nature, that are the “proximate causes of all
things.”419 Spinoza is clearly describing the immediate infinite modes when he
409
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says that “God is the proximate cause of those things that are infinite and
immutable, and which we say that he has created immediately.”420 The
immediate infinite modes are what Spinoza calls Natura naturata. In the Short
Treatise, he tells us that motion is the immediate infinite mode of extension, and
intellect, the immediate infinite mode of thought:
Turning now to universal Natura naturata, or those modes or
creatures which immediately depend on, or have been created by
God—we know only two of these: Motion in matter, and Intellect in
the thinking thing. We say, then, that these have been from all
eternity, and will remain to all eternity, immutable, a work truly as
great as the greatness of the workman.421
While Spinoza holds that motion is an essential aspect of extension, it is a
controversial topic in interpretation. In that same chapter in the Short Treatise,
Spinoza says of motion that “it belongs more properly to a treatise on Natural
science than here.”422 A mysterious footnote423 indicates that Spinoza wished to
revise his account of motion. Near the end of Spinoza life, Tschirnhaus requested
a clarification of motion. His epistle reads: “If time and opportunity permit, I
humbly beg you to let me have the true definition of motion, together with its
explanation.”424 Unfortunately, Spinozaʼs reply isnʼt helpful: “As for your other
questions, namely, concerning motion, and those which concern method, since
my views on these are not written out in due order, I reserve them for another
occasion.”425 These are Spinozaʼs words just over two years before his death,
and during that time, his health seriously declined due to either tuberculosis or
silicosis.
While it may be the case that Spinoza never revised his views on motion, he
holds that under the attribute of extension, “motion and rest”426 is the immediate
infinite mode. We might take this to mean that mobility is entailed by the nature of
extension, and thus extended things are necessarily mobile. But this is a weaker
version than Spinozaʼs statement in the Short Treatise that motion itself is the
infinite immediate mode of extension.427 This means that motion-and-rest follow
from the nature of extension. When Spinoza discusses the nature of extension in
the second part of the Ethics, he asserts that from the fact that “all bodies agree
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in certain things,”428 by which he means that they “involve the concept of one and
the same attribute”429 it follows that “now they move, now they are at rest.”430
This is quite the opposite of the Cartesian account of motion. For Descartes
had said that it is the case that extension can be put into motion, motion itself
doesnʼt follow from the nature of extension. An external source is needed to put
extension into motion, which is why Descartes says that “God is the primary
cause of motion; and he always preserves the same quantity of motion in the
universe.”431 Spinoza is quite aware of his departure from Descartes,432 for he
holds that extension is the cause of motion. To support this view, we must
consider what Spinoza calls Natura naturans. In the Short Treatise, he says:
By Natura naturans we understand a being that we conceive clearly
and distinctly through itself, without needing anything other than
itself (like all the attributes which we have so far described), i.e.,
God. The Thomists have also understood God by this phrase, but
their Natura naturans was a being (as they called it) beyond all
substances.433
In the Ethics he describes Natura naturans as “what is in itself and conceived
through itself, or such attributes of substance as express an eternal and infinite
essence, i.e. God, insofar as he is considered as a free cause.”434 Recall, that a
free cause is that which is determined to act by itself alone, and exists from the
necessity of its nature alone.435 Substance as Natura naturans has an intrinsic
active power. This position is justified by Proposition XXXIV, where Spinoza
claims that Godʼs power is his essence itself: “For from the necessity alone of
Godʼs essence it follows that God is the cause of himself and of all things.
Therefore, Godʼs power, by which he and all things are and act, is his essence
itself.”436 Spinozaʼs God is substance and isnʼt an efficient cause external to finite
substance, as Descartes held. Since the attributes constitute Godʼs essence,
Godʼs power to act belongs to substance and the attributes. In the attribute of
extension, Godʼs power is expressed immediately as motion. 437
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XXXV. Joachim on Motion in Spinozaʼs System
As Joachim notes, Spinozaʼs theory of the intelligible structure and constitution of
the physical world, and its derivation from the attribute of extension was never set
out “systematically and in final form.”438 The significance of what Spinoza has to
say on this is, says Joachim, is made sufficiently clear by comparing and
contrasting it with the Cartesian theory. According to Descartes, God created
matter as something extended in three dimensions. At the same time God
created, and implanted in matter, a definite quantity of motion-and-rest, which is
maintained per solum suum concursum ordinarium.439 For Descartes, since the
physical world is nothing but three-dimensional space, which is substantiated into
matter, and divided and articulated by motion, it must be, says Joachim,
explained in accordance with the principles of geometry and kinetics. It is
impossible for this to be the case for Spinoza, for there is only one substance. No
constituent part of matter is substantial in the way Descartes holds that it is, nor
is matter as a whole. For Spinoza, there is no inert matter. The substance
underlying extension is “God or Nature—i.e., the Absolute Individual which
eternally creates and, in creating, sustains the created as modes or affections of
itself.”440 According to Joachim, Descartesʼ assumption of a physical substratum
compelled him to invoke a separate creative act to introduce motion into matter
ab extra to overcome the inherent inertia of the supposed corporeal substance.
Thus, Spinozaʼs correction of the Cartesian conception of matter leads him to
also correct the Cartesian conception of motion.441
Both Spinoza and Descartes hold that the total quantity of motion-and-rest in
the physical world is eternally the same. The infinite and eternal mode, what
Joachim calls “the eternal constant,”442 flows inevitably as the immediate intrinsic
effect of the attribute of extension.443 From the deduction in the eternal descent of
modes which it exhibits, the first and ʻmost immediateʼ mode is motion-and-rest,
which Spinoza describes in the second appendix of the Short Treatise as “that
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which, in order to exist, needs no other mode in the same attribute.”444 Joachim
states:
Spinoza conceived it both as the eternally constant whole, and as
the originative source, of all movements and rests in the physical
world. It is the whole, of which they are all parts; the universal, of
which they are the dependent and derivative particulars. And, being
thus a genuine or concrete universal (prior to, and the system of, its
particulars), it is—Spinoza maintains—a genuine, eternal, singular
or individual.445
Motion-and-rest is what Spinoza describes in the Tractatus de Intellectus
Emendatione as one of the fixed and eternal things.446 Using Aristotelian
terminology, Joachim tells us that motion-and-rest us first in the modal system of
extension both really and logically, for “it must be if anything is to be, and it must
be known if anything is to be known, in the physical world.”447 There are a
number of objections that have been raised against Spinozaʼs theory of motionand rest,448 but a full discussion of these would be a large digression away from
Spinozaʼs metaphysics into Spinozaʼs physics. Now that I have presented the
objections, I pass them on. Joachim concludes his account of Spinozaʼs account
of motion-and-rest with some further difficulties:
In Spinozaʼs theory of the physical world, then, motion (i.e., ʻmotionand-restʼ) is fundamental and primary—not, as in the Cartesian
doctrine, co-ordinate with, or secondary to, matter or mass. He
seems in fact to be feeling after—to have projected and in part to
have worked out—a physics, or philosophy, of the corporeal world,
which would reduce everything to, and explain everything in terms
of, motion-and-rest, including matter or mass or mathematical
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solidity itself.449 And yet, if this was indeed the main trend of
Spinozaʼs thought, he never entirely freed himself from
reminiscences of the Cartesian doctrine. Throughout his writings,
the conception of matter or body or three-dimensional extension
(Quantitas) survives, quite inconsistently, side by side, with the
conception of motion-and-rest. It is not merely that the modes of
extension are constantly referred to as ʻbodies,ʼ or that Spinoza
speaks, e.g., of this or that body ʻbeing in,ʼ or ʻhaving and
maintaining,ʼ its proportion of motion to rest.450 Such language is
natural and could be justified on the grounds of convenience and
clarity of exposition. But Spinoza, in spite of his criticism of
Descartes, still thinks of the intelligible structure of the physical
world as woven (so to speak) out of two distinct sets of principles—
the laws of extension and the laws of motion; and even in the Ethics
he still appears to postulate certain minimal corpuscles, certain
atomic solids, as the bearers of, and not themselves reducible to,
motion and rest.451

XXXVI. Wolf on the Dynamic Character of Reality and Motion
Abraham Wolf draws attention to Spinozaʼs dynamic character of the universe,
which is made evident when his conception of extension is compared with the
Cartesian theory. It is a common assumption, says Wolf, that because both
Descartes and Spinoza both use the same term, extension, that they both mean
the same thing. Wolf stresses that this is a grave mistake. On the Cartesian
conception, matter is nothing else but extension, and it is by nature inert. The
result of this view is that Descartes had to invoke a deus ex machina in order to
create matter, to maintain its existence, to impart motion-and-rest to it, and to
keep the quantity of motion-and-rest constant. “Altogether, the Cartesian
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philosophy not only treats God like an outsider, but works Him terribly hard in
keeping this sorry scheme of things together.”452
Spinozaʼs universe is one which is self-sufficient, autonomous, perfectly
rational, free from external interference, and free from arbitrariness or caprice.453
Spinoza is thus strongly opposed to the Cartesian theory of matter as merely
extension and inert, for the physical universe could not be the result of such a
conception of matter. In Spinozaʼs correspondence, Tschirnhaus reminded him
that Descartes maintained that he could not deduce the variety of things from
ʻExtensionʼ “in any other way than by supposing that this was an effect produced
in Extension by motion started by God.”454 But it is this assumption of miracles
that Spinoza views as unphilosophical. According to Wolf, Spinoza has a
dynamic conception of matter, a kind of:
Physical Energy, which expresses itself in the infinite mode of
motion and rest, which consequently need not be introduced
miraculously from outside the material world…the dynamic
interpretation of extension makes the relation of motion and rest (or
energy of motion and energy of position) to extension
intelligible…For how can motion be logically derived from
extension? Motion implies extension; but extension does not imply
motion. If therefore, Spinoza admitted only logico-mathematical
relations, then motion should have been the attribute and extension
itʼs mode…what he did say, already in the Short Treatise, was that
extension is ʻthe power to produceʼ motion and rest (or kinetic and
potential energy, as we might say).455
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The problem of motion is one that a mind can easily get lost in, but what is
evident is that Spinoza is not thinking of extension as Descartes had defined it.
Spinoza clearly states in his epistle to Tschirnhaus that Descartes has a faulty
definition of matter:
With regard to your question as to whether the variety of things can
be demonstrated a priori solely from the conception of Extension, I
think I have already made it quite clear that this is impossible. That
is why Descartes is wrong in defining matter through extension; it
must necessarily be explicated through an attribute which
expresses eternal and infinite essence.456
What can be said is that Spinoza believes that a reasonable notion of matter and
extension must be a notion of dynamic matter and extension. Dynamism in the
extended realm is understood in terms of motion-and-rest such that motion and
rest are ways (or modes) of being dynamically extended. In the mental realm, this
same dynamism is reflected in representation and volition. In the end, this leaves
little difference between extension and motion-and-rest.457

XXXVII. The Absolutely Infinite Intellect
Conversely, the immediate infinite mode of thought is what Spinoza calls in
Epistle LXIV the “absolutely infinite intellect.”458 By this he means Godʼs actual
thinking of everything. Steven Nadler interprets the absolutely infinite intellect as
“the infinite and eternal set of adequate ideas composing Godʼs intellect. It is, in
essence, a perfect knowledge of everything.”459 This is a very fruitful
interpretation, considering what Spinoza says of the mode of thought which
immediately depends on God in his discussion of Natura naturata in the Short
Treatise: “As for Intellect in the thinking thing, this too is a Son, product or
immediate creature of God, also created by him from all eternity, and remaining
immutable to all eternity. Its sole property is to understand everything clearly and
distinctly at all times.”460 Further, Spinoza calls this infinite immediate mode in
Proposition XXI “Godʼs idea”461 and in one of the last propositions of the Ethics,
Spinoza identifies “Godʼs eternal and infinite intellect”462 as a collection of eternal
minds or ideas. This justifies Nadlerʼs claim that “the absolutely infinite intellect is
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a collection of ideas constituted by Godʼs infinite thinking of the eternal essences
of things.”463

XXXVIII. Mediate Infinite Modes
The mediate infinite modes are even more obscure. In Proposition XXII, Spinoza
describes these modes by stating that these modes do not follow directly from
the divine nature, but from “some attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a
modification which, through the same attribute, exists necessarily and is
infinite.”464 What is even more daunting for interpreters of Spinoza is the fact that
he doesnʼt indicate what the mediate infinite modes of extension and thought are.
We are all indebted to Tschirnhaus for asking Spinoza to clarify what these
modes are, through his friend Georg Schuller. Spinoza was pressed to “have
examples of those things produced by the mediation of some infinite
modification.”465 While Spinoza had provided Tschirnhaus with the examples of
the immediate infinite modes: motion-and-rest in extension, and the absolutely
infinite intellect in thought, he only provides one example of a mediate infinite
mode: facies totius universi.466 The facies totius universi, varies in infinite ways,
yet always remains the same. Spinoza references the Scholium to Lemma VII in
the second part of the Ethics, from which we can infer that the facies totius
universi is likely an example of extension, since Spinoza does not directly tell us
which attribute it belongs to.
What exactly Spinoza means by facies totius universi is a controversial
interpretive issue. Martial Gueroult seems to interpret this as the totality of all
existing material things, the infinite and eternal series of the existing finite modes
of extension. This is “the series of existing bodies that durationally realize the
eternal essences of bodies that, as we saw, can be regarded as the contents of
the immediate infinite mode in Extension.”467 On this view, which is expanded
upon by Steven Nadler, the facies totius universi is the entirety of the contents of
the physical universe, “all particular bodies and all their relations throughout all
time—considered as an eternal, infinite set and as an individual in its own
right.”468 This is what Spinoza means when he replies to Schuller and
Tschirnhaus, that the facies totius universi, “although varying in infinite ways, yet
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remains always the same.”469 On this account, the overall proportion of motionand-rest is always the same among the variations of “ever-changing material
things.”470 The reference Spinoza gives to Schuller and Tschirnhaus from the
second part of the Ethics discusses “how a composite Individual can be affected
in many ways, and still preserve its nature.”471 A particular body which is
composed of simpler parts preserves its identity “because its component parts
nonetheless maintain a particular ratio of motion and rest among themselves.”472
Spinoza was very aware of the Cartesian principle of the preservation of the
proportion of motion-and-rest in the universe. Thus, Nadler says that by
“proceeding upwards, through more composite individuals made up of such
composite bodies, and so on, one finally reaches the material universe itself as
the ultimate composite individual.”473 This is supported by Spinozaʼs statement of
macrocosm and microcosm: “We shall easily conceive that the whole of nature is
one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any
change of the whole Individual.”474
There is a long history in philosophy of this conception of man as a small
universe. Plato, in the Timaeus, describes the universe as a resembling “more
closely than anything else that Living Thing of which all other living things are
parts”475 and as a “single visible living thing, which contains within itself all the
living things whose nature it is to share its kind.”476 Later in the Timaeus, he
describes the structure of man as an imitation of the spherical form of the
cosmos: “Copying the revolving shape of the universe, the gods bound the two
divine orbits into a ball-shaped body, the part that we now call our head. This is
the most divine part of us, and master of all our other parts.”477 In the Physics,
Aristotle refers to animal life as a “small world.”478 The analogy of man as a small
universe and the universe as a great man appears in Judah ha-Levi479 and
Maimonides.480 While Spinoza follows these men in singling out man, his
motivation differs from theirs, for he does not believe that man holds a special
place in the universe. Wolfson describes Spinozaʼs position adequately, when he
says: “In singling out man from the innumerable particular things in nature,
Spinoza was not motivated by the belief that man occupies a place which is
unique in nature, but rather was he motivated by the belief that man is a part of
nature and that he epitomizes in himself, as it were, the whole of nature.”481
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On Spinozaʼs view the whole of physical nature follows from the attribute of
extension combined with the immediate infinite mode of motion-and-rest. As
Nadler puts it, “take matter, add motion, and you get a world of particular
individuals.”482 Thus, Nadlerʼs interpretation answers the problem of change in
Spinoza, that is, the question of how it is that change exists in the modes while
substance and its attributes are unchanging. While change exists on the level of
particular physical individuals, the physical universe itself as the overall
proportion of motion-and-rest is eternal and immutable. Thus, an infinite mode is
also eternal and immutable.
But how, one might wonder, do the infinite modes exist of necessity? Spinoza
tells us that anything which follows from something that exists of necessity,
necessarily exists itself.483 Since the immediate infinite modes follow from God,
who necessarily exists, they exist of absolute necessity.484 Further, the mediate
infinite modes must exist of absolute necessity, since they follow from the
immediate infinite modes. Thus, Spinoza says in the demonstration of
Proposition XXIII:
Therefore, the mode, which exists necessarily and is infinite, has
had to follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God—
either immediately (see Proposition XXI) or by some mediating
modification, which follows from its absolute nature, i.e. (by
Proposition XXII), which exists necessarily and is infinite.485
It is evident from this how Spinoza conceives of both kinds of infinite modes as
necessary. Godʼs essence immediately gives rise to certain aspects of the world.
Each of the infinite immediate modes is infinite through its cause, and has an
infinity of parts that are inseparable. The mediate infinite mode encompasses all
of the relations of motion-and-rest in extension and of the ideas in the realm of
thought. Spinoza accounts for the rise of finite things by interposing infinite
modes between God and finite modes.

482

Nadler, Spinozaʼs Ethics: An Introduction, 96.
Ethics, I, Proposition XXI: “All the things which follow from the absolute nature of any of Godʼs
attribute have always had to exist and be infinite, or are, through the same attribute, eternal and
infinite.” C I.429.
484
I distinguish absolute from hypothetical necessity. Something exists with hypothetical
necessity if it necessarily follows from a cause, but its cause does not necessarily exist. On the
other hand, something exists with absolute necessity if it necessarily follows from a cause, and its
cause necessarily exists.
485
Ethics I, Proposition XXIII, Dem. C I.431.
483

88
XXXIX. Finite Modes and Acosmism
The last thing to account for in the realm of modes is the particular existents, the
modes which are “determined by another to exist and to produce an effect in a
certain and determinate manner.”486 While these finite modes follow from the
infinite modes, there is yet another distinction. Finite modes include the individual
eternal essences of particular things, found in the immediate infinite modes, and
the actually existing particular things that instantiate those essences in time,
found within the mediate infinite modes.487
God is the efficient cause of all things, as we have said. Spinoza reminds us
of this in Proposition XXV: “God is the efficient cause, not only of the existence of
things, but also of their essence.”488 For, as Spinoza tells us, “if you deny this,
then God is not the cause of the essence of things; and so (by Axiom IV) the
essence of things can be conceived without God. But (by Proposition XV) this is
absurd. Therefore God is also the cause of the essence of things.”489 It is this fact
that brings to light the importance of God as an immanent cause. As we have
seen, Spinoza demonstrates in Proposition XV that whatever is, is in God, and
nothing can be or be conceived without God. It follows from this that “particular
things are nothing but affections of Godʼs attributes, or modes by which Godʼs
attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way.”490 Thus, the finite
modes of the attribute of extension are particular bodies, and the finite modes of
the attribute of thought are particular ideas or minds. It is the immanence of
Godʼs causality that defines modes, for there is nothing outside of God, and
everything that exists, must be in God. Nothing in Nature can be separated from
its causal system, not even man. This is why Gilles Deleuze declares:
A finite mode cannot be separated: 1. by its essence, from the
infinity of other essences that all agree with one another in the
infinite immediate mode; 2. by its existence, from the infinity of
other existing modes that are causes of it under different relations
implied in the mediate infinite mode; 3. or finally, from the infinity of
extensive parts that each existing mode actually possesses under
its own relation.491
It might appear that there is a contradiction in Spinozaʼs reasoning, for how can
the finite follow from the infinite? There has been a strange tendency in history to
accuse Spinoza of acosmism, championed by Solomon Maimon and G. W. F.
Hegel. Acosmism is the view that God is real, and the world, or cosmos, of finite
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things, is not real; the acosmist thus admits of only one ultimately real being,
namely God. Consider Maimonʼs characterization of Spinoza:
In this [Spinozaʼs] system unity is real, but diversity is merely ideal.
In the atheistic system it is just the other way around. The diversity
is real and grounded in the very nature of things, while the unity,
which one observes in the order and regularity of nature, is
consequently only coincidental; through this unity we determine our
arbitrary system for the sake of our knowledge. It is inconceivable
how one could make the Spinozistic system into atheism since
these two systems are the exact opposites of each other. Atheism
denies the existence of God, Spinozism denies the existence of the
world. Rather, Spinozism should be called ʻacosmism.ʼ492
While it may be tempting to place Spinoza in the category of acosmism, for he
does hold that there is only one substantial reality, he clearly isnʼt an acosmist.493
As Yitzhak Melamed points out, there are four key doctrines in Spinoza that
conflict with the acosmist reading. While three of the four are doctrines from later
parts in the Ethics, one of them is Spinozaʼs assertion in Proposition XVI that
“from the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in
infinitely many modes.”494 Melamed explains how this doctrine conflicts with an
acosmist reading of Spinoza:
Spinoza claims that the modes are just what follow necessarily from
Godʼs nature or essence. Furthermore, in Proposition XXXVI
(“Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow”)
makes clear that everything, including Godʼs nature, must have
some effects. But, if the modes (i.e., the effects of Godʼs nature)
were illusory, then Godʼs nature would not really have any
effects.495
Melamedʼs account draws its strength from Spinozaʼs endorsement in
Proposition XVI of the principle of ontological plenitude. The finite modes follow
from the infinite because the series of finite modes itself is infinite. There are, in
fact, an infinite number of finite modes within each series. The series of finite
modes under an attribute is the infinite mode of that attribute, and follows from
492
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causes that are infinite.496 As Denton Snider remarks of Spinozaʼs system: “The
links of the chain are finite modes, but the total chain is the infinite mode.”497
In Proposition XXVI Spinoza states: “A thing which has been determined to
produce an effect has necessarily been determined in this way by God; and one
which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an
effect.”498 There is a parallel between the concept of a thing being determined to
act and determined to exist, as Spinoza will soon bring out, that is, God
determines things both to exist and to act. Since these finite modes are not the
causes of themselves, they cannot act unless they are determined to do so. All
modes, including human beings, can no more determine themselves to action
than they can determine themselves to existence. This means that free will is an
illusion. When Spinoza says in Proposition XXVII that “a thing which has been
determined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined,”499
he means to tell us that we donʼt even have the freedom to do nothing. As he
states later, “men are deceived in that they think themselves free, an opinion
which consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant
of the causes by which they are determined.”500
In Proposition XXVIII, Spinoza gives an account of finite causality that has
been quite puzzling to interpreters:
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a
determinate existence, can neither exist nor be determined to
produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and produce an
effect by another cause, which is also finite and has a determinate
existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist not be
determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and
produce an effect by another, which is also finite and has a
determinate existence, and so on, to infinity.501
As Edwin Curley says of this proposition, “many commentators have wondered
how the finite causality affirmed here could be consistent with the divine causality
affirmed in Propositions XXVI and XXVII.”502 For in Proposition XXVI, Spinoza
says that it is God who determines finite modes to action, whereas now in
Proposition XXVIII, Spinoza says that finite modes are determined to act by other
finite modes. Steven Nadler reconciles these two propositions, since finite things
are modes of God:
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Every causal relationship among finite things is a function both of
those finite things themselves and of the infinite things (natures and
laws) that govern the behavior of those finite things. Every event in
nature stands at the intersection of the two causal nexuses: a
ʻhorizontalʼ nexus within which a thing is temporally and causally
related to (infinitely many) prior and posterior things; and a ʻverticalʼ
nexus within which a thing and its relationship to other things is
causally related to eternal principles, culminating in Natureʼs
attributes. Proposition XXVIII refers to the first causal nexus and
Proposition XXVI refers to the second one. As the finite thing is
embedded in its horizontal relationship to infinitely many other finite
things, the infinite series of causally related finite things (a mediate
infinite mode) is in turn embedded in—and derives its necessity
from—a vertical relationship to higher infinite modes and, ultimately,
substance itself. The infinite chain of finite causes itself is brought
into being by the infinite causes. Or, as one commentator so
elegantly puts it, every finite mode is brought about by (or deducible
from) an infinite series of other finite causes and a finite series of
infinite causes.503
On this account, God doesnʼt determine finite things directly, as he does the
immediate infinite modes, but indirectly, insofar as God is modified both by the
infinite modes and by other finite modes.504 As Spinoza says in the
demonstration to Proposition XXVIII, every singular thing must “follow from, or be
determined to exist and produce an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar
as it is modified by a modification which is finite and has a determinate
existence.”505 Because of this, everything ultimately depends on God, either
immediately (immediate infinite modes), or mediately, through infinite things
alone (mediate infinite modes), or through both infinite and finite things (finite
modes). Spinoza concludes Proposition XXVIII by reminding us that “all things
that are, are in God, and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be
conceived without him.”506

XL. Causality and Logic
It is an axiom for Spinoza that “from a given determinate cause the effect follows
necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for
503
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an effect to follow.”507 By this axiom, causes necessitate their effects. Applied to
God, who in an uncaused efficient cause of everything else, all things which exist
are causally grounded in God. Things that exist either follow from God directly or
indirectly (by more immediate effects of God). For “from the necessity of the
divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes,
(i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect.)”508
A problem here arises that must be dealt with, namely the charge that
Spinoza assimilates the relation of causality to the relation of logical implication,
and that he is not warranted in doing so. The proponent of this objection might
say that there is a difference between an effect necessarily following from its
cause and two things being logically connected. Further, the objector might say
that logical necessity is what holds between propositions, as in geometry, and
not between cause and effect. This objection is nothing new, as its underlying
basis was made popular by the Scottish philosopher David Hume. A final
Humean point to this objection is the following: the necessity of causal
relationships is dependent upon a nomological necessity. This means that talk of
one thing being the cause of another is an appeal to how the laws of nature
happen to imply a relation between two things. The point is that while we hold it
to be contrary to a law of nature that, for example, the speed of light is 670, 616,
629 miles per hour, it does not follow without demonstrating that the laws of
nature are themselves logically necessary that the speed of light couldnʼt have
been different. While affirming a and denying a is a logical contradiction, on this
view just because a causes b it does not follow that there is a logical
contradiction in affirming a and denying b.
Spinoza would not be willing to say that one thing can cause another without
having the same necessity of logical propositions. Edwin Curley offers a
discussion of this objection, where he first justifies that it makes sense to make
this objection to Spinoza.509 He points out that Spinoza characterizes the
relationship between substance and mode by saying that God is the cause of the
things that are in him, that he has produced them or determined them, or that
they follow from him. It is this following from which implies a relation of logical
implication between substance and mode. Consider also the geometrical analogy
given by Spinoza:
I have shown clearly enough (see Proposition XVI) that from Godʼs
supreme power, or infinite nature, infinitely many things in infinitely
many modes, i.e., all things, have necessarily flowed, or always
follow, by the same necessity and in the same way as from the
nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its
three angles are equal to two right angles.510
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It is clear, as Curley notes, that Spinoza thinks the relation between God and
modes is not merely a necessary relation, but a relation that is logically
necessitated.
Leibniz commented on this specific passage, objecting: “one cannot prove by
any argument that things follow from God as properties follow from the triangle,
nor is there an analogy between essences and existing things.”511 Leibniz seems
to hint that the relation of logical implication obtains only between essences, and
that it is absurd to talk of logical implication between existing things. Answers to
these objections have been less than impressive. This is likely due to the fact
that, as Curley points out, “if all things do follow from God in this way, then it
ought to be possible, in principle, to deduce the existence of particular finite
beings from the existence of the Infinite Being. Spinoza does not carry out any
such deduction, which has been variously interpreted as a flaw in the system or
as a natural defect of human knowledge.”512 Failure to present satisfactory and
comprehensive responses to these objections arises from the lack of textual
support.
I believe that we can respond to this objection by saying that, for Spinoza, the
relation of causal dependence isnʼt to be assimilated with logical implication, but
instead that the relation of causal dependence is to be assimilated to a relation of
conceptual dependence.513 On this view, to say that a causes b is to say that b is
conceived through a, or that b conceptually depends on a.
Be that as it may, Spinoza has no use for a distinction between things
following from Godʼs essence and properties following from the essence or
definition of a thing. For Spinoza, all things are necessary because the laws of
nature are themselves necessary.
A thing is called necessary either by reason of its essence or by
reason of its cause. For a thingʼs existence follows necessarily
either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient
cause.514
Though, as Steven Nadler has pointed out,515 it is false to read Spinoza
distinguishing between two different kinds of necessity: logical or metaphysical
vs. causal. Rather, Spinoza is informing us that there are two different ways that
something is necessitated: internally and externally. There is no differentiation of
two separate kinds of necessity, for internal and external necessity are both
absolute necessity. When something is internally necessitated, it derives its
511
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necessity from its essence.516 That which is externally necessitated derives its
necessity from antecedent conditions. All such antecedent conditions depend on
God as the efficient cause, whose existence is necessitated by his essence, i.e.,
from an internal necessity. Thus, whether something is determined by a
conceptual or logical necessity or by a causal necessity doesnʼt make a
difference. Thus, we can at least begin to respond to the critics of Spinoza. that
he is justified in claiming that from Godʼs infinite nature all things “have
necessarily flowed, or always follow, by the same necessity and in the same way
as from the nature of a triangle it follows, from eternity and to eternity, that its
three angles are equal to two right angles.”517 For in the Cogitata Metaphysica,
Spinoza writes: “For if men understood clearly the whole order of Nature, they
would find all things just as necessary as are all those treated in Mathematics.”518

XLI. Necessitarianism
Now that I have given an outline of causality and logic in relation to absolute
necessity, I will turn to Spinozaʼs rejection of contingency and his argument for
necessitarianism. Spinoza was content on removing the idea of contingency from
metaphysics altogether. This was an extremely radical move, and one that
gained him a great deal of attention.
God is an infinite and eternal dynamic substance of which nothing is excluded
from its nature. We have seen that there are two necessary and eternal effects of
God: the immanent laws of nature, or infinite series of atemporal essences, and
the world of existing things, which are mediated through the first effect of God.
This modal world we know so well are merely instantiations of the eternal
essences or laws of nature in time. All things are ultimately dependant on and
determined by Godʼs nature or essence, and God depends no external
substance. It follows that since God exists necessarily,519 nothing could have
been otherwise than it is.
We have already seen Spinozaʼs early views on contingency.520 In
Proposition XXIX of the Ethics Spinoza boldly states: “In nature nothing is
contingent, but all things have been determined from the necessity of the divine
nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain way.”521 It is important to be
clear about Spinozaʼs meaning of the term contingent, for he seems to employ
the term in two different ways in the Ethics. He often uses the term to mean that
which is causally undetermined. However, in the Fourth Part of the Ethics, he
distinguishes between contingent and possible.
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I call singular things contingent insofar as we find nothing, while we
attend only to their essence, which necessarily posits their
existence or which necessarily excludes it.522
I call the same singular things possible, insofar as, while we attend
to the causes from which they must be produced, we do not know
whether those causes are determined to produce them.523
In this second sense of contingency, something is contingent when it is a middleground between necessary and impossible. It is not necessary by reason of its
essence nor is it impossible because its essence involves a contradiction.
However, something contingent in this sense is still necessitated by reason of its
cause, but is not necessitated by reason of its essence. This sense of
contingency exists in Spinozaʼs system, but this is not the same sense of
contingency that Spinoza is referring to when he says: “I have shown more
clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of
which they can be called contingent.”524 Spinoza is attacking the first sense of
contingency as that which is causally undetermined, that which he defines as
possible in the Fourth Part of the Ethics.
Spinozaʼs argument that nothing is contingent rests on his ability to
demonstrate three things: that all things have been determined by God to exist,
to exist in a certain way, and to produce effects in a certain way. He argues in
Proposition XXIX that whatever is, is in God. However, God canʼt be called
contingent, for God exists necessity. The modes also follow from God necessarily
and not contingently, and God is the cause of modes in their existence and as
they are considered to produce an effect. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza says:
If the contingent thing is contingent because its cause is contingent
[with respect to its existence], then that cause must also be
contingent because the cause that produced it is also contingent
[with respect to its existence,] and so on, to infinity. And because
we have already proven that everything depends on one single
cause, then that cause would also have to be contingent. And this
is plainly false.525
If God had not determined them, then it impossible, not contingent, that they
should determine themselves. Since they have been determined by God, it is
also impossible, not contingent, that they should render themselves
undetermined. Consider Axiom III: “From a sgiven determinate cause the effect
522
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follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is
impossible for an effect to follow.”526
This leads Spinoza to assert: “Things could have been produced by God in no
other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.”527 Since all
things follow from Godʼs given nature, and have been determined by Godʼs
nature to exist (in a certain way) and to produce effects in a certain way, it follows
that if the order of Nature could be different, then Godʼs nature could be different,
and therefore this other nature of God would necessarily have to exist. Thus,
there would be two substances, which is absurd. It follows, says Spinoza, that
things could have been produced in no other way or order. Spinoza describes
that what we call contingency in the sense of being causally undetermined, is
merely an inadequate conception of the order of Nature:
A thing is called contingent only because of a defect in our
knowledge. For if we do not know that the thingʼs essence involves
a contradiction, or if we do know very well that its essence does not
involve a contradiction, and nevertheless can affirm nothing
certainly about its existence, because the order of causes is hidden
from us, it can never seem to us either necessary or impossible. So
we call it contingent or possible.528
It is evident that Spinoza is going much further than the typical hard determinist
thesis that everything is causally determined to its existence and to bring out the
effects that it does. But for Spinoza, additional premise of the necessitarian
position that this causal order couldnʼt have been otherwise seems to him much
more consistent. Both the essences and laws of things and the world of existing
things are an absolutely necessary effect of God. Whatever follows from the
absolute nature of any of Godʼs attributes (or from some attribute of God insofar
as it is modified by a modification) have always had to exist and be infinite, or
are, through the same attribute, eternal and infinite.529 Substance and its
attributes are logically necessary by reason of its essence, while the infinite
modes have a logical necessity by reason of its cause. As Steven Nadler puts it:
“These things (including ʻthe face of the whole universeʼ) could not possibly have
been otherwise, but that is because they have been necessarily determined by
something that, in and of itself, could not possibly have been otherwise.”530 Thus,
the finite modes, as the constituents of a series that itself could not possibly have
been otherwise, are also absolutely necessary.531 For Spinoza, we live in the
526
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best of all possible worlds because we live in the only possible world, but one
which is maximally ontologically rich.

XLII. A Final Note: The Problem of Attributes532
Spinozaʼs theory of attributes has left scholars with perplexing interpretive issues.
Descartes had defined the attribute of a substance as its essence, and concludes
that each substance has only one attribute. Spinoza gives us a different definition
of an attribute as that which the intellect perceives of a substance as constituting
its essence, hence not limiting substances to having only one attribute. The
difficulty in interpretation is largely due to the translation of the Latin word
tanquam. As countless interpreters of Spinoza have pointed out, the word can
mean either “as if, but not in fact” or “as in fact.” Both Shirley and Curley translate
Spinozaʼs definition of attribute as that which the intellect perceives of a
substance “as constituting its essence.” The use of the term “intellect” in
Spinozaʼs definition is likewise ambiguous, and it isnʼt immediately clear whether
Spinoza is referring to the infinite intellect or a finite intellect. How we interpret
what Spinoza means by both of these terms is necessarily tied up with how we
conceive the reality of the attributes. Spinoza claims that there is one substance
with multiple attributes. Scholars are at odds at how to make sense of this based
on Spinozaʼs definition of attribute. For if an attribute is that which constitutes the
essence of substance, then it seems to follow that Spinozaʼs substance has
multiple essences. On the other hand, if an attribute does not constitute the
essence of substance, then it follows that Spinoza is claiming that the attributes
only appear to us “as if” they constitute its essence. Some scholars have taken
the subjectivist side, which claims that the attributes do not really constitute the
essence of substance, but only appear to. Other scholars take the objectivist side
in this argument, and claim that each attribute pertains to the essence of
substance.
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XLIII. Subjectivism
Wolfson gives the most famous argument for a subjectivist interpretation of the
attributes.533 According to Wolfson, Spinoza holds that the two attributes are in
reality one essence, and merely appear to us to be distinct. Wolfson points to the
subjective language in which Spinoza continually describes attributes, which he
holds isnʼt accidental. Wolfsonʼs Spinoza considers universals, with the exception
of one universal, namely, substance, as subjective concepts.534 He points to
Spinozaʼs claim in the Cogitata Metaphysica that attributes are distinguished by
reason.535 To Wolfson, the subjective interpretation disposes of the difficulty that
accompanies the objective interpretation: “How can that essence be one and
self-identical, while its constituents are many, heterogeneous, and unrelated, is a
question which is hopeless of solution.”536 Wolfson points to Proposition X to seal
his argument: “Each attribute of a substance must be conceived through itself.”537
The Scholium to this says:
It is evident that although two attributes may be conceived to be
really distinct (i.e., one may be conceived without the aid of the
other), we still can not infer from that that they constitute two
beings, or two different substances. For it is of the nature of a
substance that each of its attributes is conceived through itself,
since all the attributes it has have always been in it together, and
one could not be produced by another, but each expresses the
reality, or being of substance.538
Wolfson says: writes that this passage implies that the two attributes appear to
the mind as being distinct from each other, however, in reality, they are one. This
is so, argues Wolfson, because Proposition X tells us that attributes, like
substance, are summa genera (conceived through itself). Therefore he argues
that the two attributes must thus be one and identical with substance. Further,
Wolfson notes that the attributes are not conceived by the mind one after the
other or deduced from the other, and have always been in substance together,
being conceived by us simultaneously. Thus, he urges, the attributes are only
different words that express the same reality and being of substance.539 Wolfson
holds that Spinoza follows the traditional conception of attributes found in
medieval Jewish rationalism.540 In other words, Spinozaʼs theory of attributes
reflects the following statement made by Joseph Albo:
533
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When I awaken from my reflections upon the plurality of attributes I
begin to realize that all the attributes are nothing but intellectual
conceptions of those perfections which must needs exist in Thy
essence but which in reality are nothing but Thy essence.541

XLIV. Objectivism
While the subjectivist account might be appealing, it has serious flaws. Spinoza is
no Kantian, and the subjectivist reading presents him along very Kantian lines.
The most striking problem with the subjectivist account is that it conflicts with a
number of passages in the Ethics that indicate that attributes have real and
objective existence. The subjectivist account undermines the passages in the
Ethics that support the claims that the attributes are really distinct and that they
really do constitute the essence of substance. Consider the following passage:
God (by Proposition XIX) and all of his attributes are eternal, i.e. (by
Definition VIII), each of his attributes expresses existence.
Therefore, the same attributes of God which (by Definition IV)
explain Godʼs eternal essence at the same time explain his eternal
existence, i.e., that itself which constitutes Godʼs essence at the
same time constitutes his existence. So his existence and his
essence are one and the same, q.e.d.542
The most persuasive argument that the attributes are really distinct is based on
Spinozaʼs demonstration of Proposition X, that each attribute of a substance
must be conceived through itself:
For an attribute is what the intellect perceives concerning a
substance, as constituting its essence (by Definition IV); so (by
Definition III) it must be conceived through itself, q.e.d.543
Since it is the case that all intellects conceive of the attributes as really distinct, it
follows that the infinite intellect of God must also conceive of the attributes as
really distinct. Since the infinite intellect understands everything truly, it must be
the case that the attributes are really distinct. But what support is there for the
claim that the attributes constitute the essence of substance? In Proposition III of
the second part of the Ethics, Spinoza says:
541
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In God there is necessarily an idea, both of his essence and of
everything that necessarily follows from his essence.544
If the subjectivist reading were correct it would follow that God misunderstands
his own essence, which clearly contradicts the preceding proposition. It appears
that the objectivist position has solved out problems. But, this solution generates
a new problem: How can one substance have a multitude of distinct essences?
Spinoza claims in the Scholium to Proposition X that “it is far from absurd to
attribute many attributes to one substance.”545 This problem is notoriously
complicated, and attempting to solve the many issues that arise from the problem
of attributes would require a study devoted to this problem alone.
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